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ABSTHACT 
The present study investigates the awareness of 
New Zealand adolescents towards nuclear issues and 
towards New Zealand's nuclear prospects in world affairs. 
A questionnaire was constructed 'I.'lhich was used to examine 
the level of awareness, as well as cognitive, emotional 
and political reactions to the fu·ture in relation to 
these issues. Five hundred and seventy adolescents 
(287 males and 283 females) aged 13 to 18 inclusive took 
part in the study. The results show that the 
adolescents believed that nuclear war is likely in the 
future, and that New Zealand has enemies without there 
being a consensus over the enemies. The results 
further reveal sex and age differences in attitudes. 
Females were more pessimistic and less politically 
knowledgeable than males. Pessimism and cynicism 
increased with age. The results suggest that whi 
these adolescents were pessimistic about the future in 
the wider realm, on a personal level they were respond-
ing in a positive way with efficacy towards the issues. 
The qualitative data also indicate that these young 
people were angry about New Zealand's prospects and 
towards nuclear issues. Cross-national comparisons 
are made between the present findings and sJcudies from 
other nations. The results are further discussed 
with reference to political socialization and the 
importance of education in increasing political 
awareness. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Living in a nuclear age has presented researchers 
with a new set of issues which health professionals and 
educators are viewing with growing concern. In recent 
years, there has been increased northern hemisphere 
research directed towards the impact of the threat of 
nuclear war on children and adolescents (e.g. Beardslee 
and Mack, 1982, 1983~ Chivian et al., 1983~ Escalona, 
1982; Goldberg et al., 1985~ Goldenring and Doctor, 
1984~ Holmborg and Bergstfom, 1984~ Schwebel and Schwebel, 
1982; Solantaus et al., 1984, 1985). However, the 
extent to which findings in the United States, Scandinavia 
and the Soviet Union apply to adolescents in countries 
historically and geographically "distant" from areas of 
overt superpower confrontation has not been so well 
documented. Australian researchers (Mann and Digby, 1984; 
McMurray and Prior, 1985) have presented findings with 
differing results, one indicating a global awareness while 
the latter showing more egocentrism. Shallcrass (1968), 
Shallcrass and Gavriel (1982) and Gray and Valentine 
(1984) were the first studies in New Zealand, the results 
of which indicate that young people are concerned about 
the future with regard to nuclear issues, if lacking in-
depth information and knowledge. 
Historically, the research in this area began soon 
after the dropping of the first nuclear bomb. Barely 
two years after the conclusion of World liJar II, about 
10,000 high school students in the united States were 
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polled by Remmers and others (1947) to discover that the 
majority of them expected their country to be involved 
in another war within 25 years. This may in fact be 
the initial survey of young people in the nuclear age. 
It was some 15 years after this opinion poll before 
other studies emerged which assessed awareness and beliefs 
of united states' children and adolescents about nuclear 
weapons and the possibilities of war (Allerhand, 1965; 
Darr, 1963; Escalona, 1962, 1963, 1965; Schwebel, 1965). 
It was argued that the pessimism about the future as 
recorded in these early studies was having a destructive 
and denigrating influence on the developmental processes 
of otherwise "normal" youth. 
The research from the sixties in the northern 
hemisphere was interpreted as revealing increased youthful 
fear, anxiety, uncertainty, and a sense of hopelessness 
and helplessness about the future. There was also 
evidence of cynicism, apathy, denial and avoidance of the 
issues which extends through into some of the eighties' 
literature. The nuclear age was partially to blame for 
youth's egocentrism and escape into drugs. Failure to 
adopt long-term goals meant that no plans for the future 
or hope existed - only impending doom, according to some 
reports. Tizard (1984) acknowledged these findings, but 
made worthy comments about the difficulty in validating 
such assumptions. It had become clear that such patterns 
in young people had not eventuated and some of the more 
recent research results were found to differ in ways 
contrary to these earlier findings. Of particular 
interest was the research which was beginning to surface 
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from countries other than the United states. 
There has been very little investigation of 
adolescent awareness nuclear issues in New Zealand. 
Therefore, it is the aim of this study to ascertain 
whether adolescents have any formulated ideas or opinions 
about current issues involving war, peace and nuclear 
weapons. If so, the intention will then be to ascertain 
the level of political understanding which these 
adolescents are knowledgeable and to objectively substan-
tiate the nature of their beliefs. This study's results 
will then be compared with other New Zealand research 
findings as well as those from overseas studies. 
In Chapter Two, the literature pertaining to 
adolescent avlareness, attitudes and opinions abou·t war, 
peace and nuclear issues is reviewed, focussing on work 
relevant to the aims of this study. Chapter Three sets 
out the research rationale and methods including the 
instrumen·t conducting the study and its procedure. 
Chapters Four and Five contain the results of this study's 
findings and discussion respectively, with some 
implications for future research. 
presented in the final chapter. 
The conclusions are 
4 
CHAPTER T~tJO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are many reasons for predicting that the 
ever present possibility of nuclear war, and all of the 
associated -tensions of nuclear war, should produce a 
wide variety of human responses. It might also be 
predicted that such responses would be maladaptive and, 
in general, difficult to identify and evaluate owing 
to the nature of attitude research. A review of the 
adolescent literature pert~ining to the nuclear predic-
ament indicates that such studies, to da"te, are pioneer 
inquiries which may best serve to promote additional 
research as ;,vell as impress the need for further 
investigation. 
The reactions of adults to nuclear threats have 
been the subject of a large amount of research by 
psychologists, psychiatrists and others (Caldicott, 1978; 
Lifton, 1979, 1982; Schell, 1982, 1984; Thompson, 1985). 
By comparison, very little attention has been given to 
predicting how children and teenagers may perceive or 
react to living in the nuclear age. Differing methods 
of studying the problem have been employed and relatively 
little systematic research has been conducted in this 
area. Longitudinal investigations of international 
scope have compelling interest; and some of the more 
recent studies which have not yet gained wide circulation 
demand closer scrutiny. 
2.2 GENEP~L BACKGROUND 
From the earliest. moments of ·the atomic age, 
according to Boyer (1986), a spontaneous and well-
5 
j us·ti uncertainty as well as fear s'\vept over America; 
triggered partially by politicization of terror in 
lectures, radio programmes, mass magazines such as LIFE 
and COLLIER'S, and artic like "Mist of Death over New 
York" in a 1947 READER'S DIGEST. This article described 
the worst panic known in human history, and depicted 
in realistic detail an atomic explosion in Nevi York 
harbour that sent a deadly radioactive cloud drifting 
over the city and beyond. . The magazine's editor vlrote 
at this time: "I think that we ... are that a sense 
of fear is probably necessary to break public apathy." 
In fact, the earl literature generally provoked a 
sense of fear and loathing, with horrors of atomic war 
depicted in the most vivid imaginable terms. This type 
literature remains the most widespread today, supported 
by a large number research scientists, psychologis·ts 
and political activists. In recent , however, 
researchers have found that apathy and self-cenJcredness 
may prevail as well in response to a nuclear awareness. 
These at·ti tudes may be tied to the envisaged proximity 
(or alternatively the lack of proximity) to the imminent 
danger of the nuclear threat. Less prolific is any 
research suggesting much hopefulness or optimism about 
the aJcomic age. 
Frank (1960) and Osgood (1962) indicated that as 
a direc·t result the cold 'i.var sis situation, peop 
were numbed to the circumstances because of its over-
6 
whelming nature and the requirements of very rapid 
adjusJcments. They claimed that this contribu·ted to 
a turning away from rational solutions.and towards 
traditionalism and nationalism. "Psychological 
numbing" a concept which Robert J. Lifton coined in 
his book, THE BROKEN CONNECTION (1979) to describe in 
neo-Freudian terms the defence mechanisms which have 
evolved in IIlearning to live with the bomb". Political 
and military leaders as well as scientists are able to 
"ge"t on wi th things" by exc 1 uding the personal 
feelings a coniliination of blocking and absence of 
images. kmong the general population, this i~mobilising 
. 
condition is often tied to either apathy or to a feeling 
of helplessness and hopelessness, according to Beck and 
Frankel (198l) and other theorists. The psychological 
mechanisms which come into play include avoidance ("I 
don't want Jco think about itll} , resignation (lilf it happens, 
it happens ll ), and a blocking of feelitig; This blocking 
tends to lead to the result that people go about their 
daily business as though the nuclear threat does not 
exist. It is this phenomenon of psychological numbing 
which researchers have come to recognise as being the 
most paralysing; for although too much anxiety inhibits 
one from taking action, so too does emotional numbing 
(Boyer, 1986; Sandman and Valenti, 1986). 
Kraus, Mehling and El-Ass (1963) claimed that 
reactions of populations to danger (varying from mass 
hysteria to general apathy) provoke perplexing problems 
for attitude research. Boyer, Sandman and Valenti have 
most recently stated that the very research literature 
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which some anti-nuclear activists and researchers have 
published has served to achieve oppos and opposing 
effects -to what may have been desired or to what has 
indeed been expected. Much of the early literature and 
tha-c which has followed may have unwi t-tingly contributed 
to a nuclear build-up on the part of government policy* 
as a consequence of public attitudes. 
Volkan (1985) takes phenomenon of nuclear 
proliferation further by suggesting that people (and 
consequently governments) need to have enemies; that 
there is a natural, psychologically based necessity to 
have advers in order to maintain and regulate their 
sense of "self". Frank (1982) says that the "image of 
.Iche enemy" is universal. When threatened by political 
or military conflic'c, members any group revert to 
childhood ways of reinforcing bonding. Volkan 
sees this need as the basis of political psychology and 
such character traits are crystallised in adolescence. 
The cogency of this developmental approach suggests that 
youthful attitudes must be tapped and better understood. 
Much of the adolescent literature to date comprises 
research which is ly anxiety-based, full of fear, 
helplessness and lessness, or apathy and denial. 
Only very recently have there been some studies to 
indicate emotional responses which might lead to possible 
useful action, if the theorists are correct. 
* Such government policy had the e of distract-
~ng citizens from internal prob such as minority 
group pressures, economic and social inequalities and 
unrest in the United States. This was not the motive 
those anti-nuclear activists who continue to use fear 
tactics in an effort to stir public action. 
The following literature revieliv is presen"ted 
chronologically by decade, beginning with the 1940's 
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and 1950's, then turning to the 1960's and 1970 l s, and 
concluding finally with the most current you"th-orientated 
research relating to the nuclear threat in the 1980's. 
2.3 YOUTH RESEARCH FINDINGS IN THE 1940 l s A~D 1950 l s 
The work of J.B. Watson during the early part of 
the century established that fear is an emo"tional response 
with psychological underpinnings. It was not until 
nearer mid-century, however, that fears of a political 
nature ",[ere more selective!ly examined. Generally, 
investigators disclosed that lower socio-economic children 
tended to have more fears than upper socio-economic 
children (Angelino, Dollins and rilech, 1956). Girls were 
reported to hold more fears than boys, Negro children 
more than Caucasian children and that fears in young 
children increased with age (Jersild, Goldman and Loftus, 
1941~ Lapouse and Monk, 1953; Pratt, 1943). Fear of 
animals ,"vas recorded as the most common fear along with 
supernatural events and beings, as well as their own 
personal safety. Gastwirth and Silverblatt (1943) found 
little or no difference in the number of fear reactions 
towards war among "normal" young adolescents of different 
intellectual levels. From childhood to adolescence, 
various studies (Angelino and Shedd, 1953; Lapouse and 
!-10nk, 1953; Pintner and Levy, 1940) were not in agree-
ment as to the most prevalent types of fears. Of these 
studies, only Angelino and Shedd es·tablished that 
political fears were reported by older adolescents. 
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The Purdue University Division of Educational 
Reference polled 10,000 high school students throughout 
the United Sta·tes in 1947 to establish how young people 
looked at war and peace. Remmers, together with other 
members of the Division, found that almost half of their 
sample believed that the United states would fight in 
another war within five years, whi two-thirds expected 
their country to become involved in another war within 
t.he next twenty-five years. This survey was conduc'ced 
before the Soviet Union tested their first atomic bomb 
1948. 
2.4 YOUTH RESEARCH FINDINGS IN THE 1960's AND 1970's 
studies in early 1960's occurred at a time of 
heightened cold war tensions between Western powers and 
communist bloc countries. Research undertaken by Adams 
(1963), A11erhand (1963), Escalona (1962., 1963 and 1965), 
Sch\.vebe1 (1965), ~vade (1962) and Wrightsman (1964) assessed 
the awareness and beliefs of American young people about 
nuclear weapons and the chance of war. Apparently, some 
of these studies were prompted by the Berlin Wall and 
Cuban missile crises. 
A majority of those interviewed during this time 
spontaneously referred to nuc weapons and war. 
A11erhand is one researcher who has suggested that these 
young peop 
situation. 
were aware and reacting to the cold war 
His .investigation (an indirect approach 
which acquired reactions of youth through parents' 
report) indicated that 70% of young people talked 
spontaneously about war-related topics. A11erhand (1963) 
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reported that 35% of parents heard their primary school 
children express concern and presumably some emotional 
reactions about becoming sick from fallout or fear of 
actual a-ttack. These chi ldren, 1Ilho came from some 200 
families, revealed more concern about their own self-
protection than an awareness about the needs of others; 
although their attitudes generally reflected a world 
vie'\v in their thinking about the future. 
Escalona (1963) reported that more than 70% of her 
sampling of about 300 youth aged 10-17 spontaneously 
mentioned the issue of war and peace when asked to 
project into the world of the future. In this question-
naire, there was careful avoidance of any reference to 
the bomb or war. Escalona simply asked: IIThink about 
the world as it may be about 'cen years from now. What 
are some of the ways in which it may be different from 
what it is today?" Replies included visions of a grue-
some existence underground, or in terms of possible 
wholesale destruction. Escalona concluded that youth 
of all ages were responding to the dangers of a nuclear 
war. 
A much larger study by Schwebel (1962) came to 
very similar conclusions. In sum, from a sample of 2500 
young people, the majority said that in the event of a 
nuclear war they would have the most to lose. 
Generally, in response to questions about nuclear 
conflic-t, they said that they would pay the biggest 
price. They were bitter about being denied a chance 
to live, to love, to work, to ar children and raise 
a family. They would lose, they felt, the largest 
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portion their lives, and they would miss the 
opportunity to enjoy the pleasures they had hardly 
even begun to taste, according to Schwebel. When asked 
what they expected if there were a nuclear war, many of 
the responses were eloquent in their simplicity: iiI 
will die", or "We will all die. 1I Most of those who 
thought that they might live, nevertheless felt that 
their fate would be as bad as death. They were confused 
about wanting and hoping to be safe if it meant enduring 
a bomb shelter existence. Schwebel reported that there 
was virtually unanimous concern about the prospects of 
nuclear war, although the "brighter" and older students 
were more optimistic. He suggested that those subjects 
who were from survival needs faced the social crises 
in a different manner than did those who were more tied 
to satisfying their primary needs. Schwebel commented 
in his discussion that the higher aptitude and better-
informed classes students at all levels tended to 
oppose the bomb shelter programme. They believed that 
there was little value in the shelters. 
Remmers joined together with Blumenfeld and 
Franklin in a 1962 Purdue Panel to poll youth attitudes 
towards civil fence and fallout shelters. Of the 
2,000 high school students, 78% reported that they had 
heard at least some talk about fallout shelters in their 
home. At all ages there was clear evidence of an 
awareness, with 37% believing that the possibility of 
war was likely, 43% thinking that there was at least a 
fifty-fifty chance, and only 17% believing that war was 
unlikely. For information about defence matters, 
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subjects turned to media sources in 64% of -the cases. 
During this same , Wade (1962) conducted a 
study of indirect method or disguised approach in the 
form of a sentence completion test. School leavers 
and first-year university studen-ts were asked to comp 
sentences like: "r_ly greatest fear regarding the future 
is ... II and II I worry about ... Ii Although 23% of the 
sample of 600, in ansvlering the first question, used 
words relating to \'var and weapons, this was small 
compared with those who indicated personal fears relating 
to school, family, marriage and career. The item on 
worry showed the same pattern, but more sharply - with 
only 4% making any mention of war, security or survival. 
Wade concluded tha-t than 4% could be described as 
greatly affected by nuclear war threat, and that s 
than 8% of his first-year university student sample 
responded to the fear-of-the-future item with war-related 
words. Considering that the purpose· of vJade I s study was 
not known to the subjects, and the nature of the open-
ended questions gave them several opportunities to 
express fear of war, the results contrast with earlier 
findings thus far. 
study as evidence 
decreases with 
On the contrary, ~i7ade used his 
this kind of fear or anxiety 
A study by Adams (1963) also confirmed that 
attitude and opinion change with age. From a sample of 
4,000 young people, opinions vlere sought as to the major 
problem of the country. The one mentioned most 
frequently was "war with Russ II but in increasing age 
groups (from 10-19) there was a steadily decreasing 
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percentage of those who this as the major problem. 
Both Adams and Schwebel established that almost 50% of 
their samples believed a war was possible or likely. 
In a questionnaire study of 400 young adolescent 
boys, Wrightsman (1964) found that almos·t 60% worried 
II some, a lot, or all of ·the time" about a war starting, 
and 70% expected war within the next 20 years. The 
pessimism about the future which was recorded in 
early studies, particularly those involving younger age 
samples, resulted in speculation that the threat war 
in general, and nuclear war in particular, migh'c be having 
a destructive and maladaptive influence on developmental 
processes in otherwise "normctl" wel functioning American 
children. 
Notable research of international scope was the 
Mankind 2000 Project, administered in 1967-68 under the 
direction of Johan Galtung (1969). A questionnaire was 
devised in Europe, involving 14 countries and 11,000 
people between the ages of 14 and 40. The object was 
to discover the attitudes of the group who would be 
providing much of the influence in their respective 
countries by the 2000 A.D. Galtung made clear that 
the research would have no predictive value; that it 
only intended to tap attitudes at that time. A condensed 
summary of the maj or findings in the student. samples 
(which came from West Germany, tain, New Zealand, 
Sweden and the United States) indicated that students 
were highly expo to and concerned "\tTi th the future, 
especially the future of the itlorld. At the same time, 
they were very present-orientated, carrying many of the 
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perspectives of the countries in which they lived. 
They lacked a map of the fu"cure and -the future did not 
seem to have a direction for them. They knew better 
wha"t they did no t want, did not accept and did not 
believe in than the opposite. students tended to have a 
more gloomy vie-;;,v of the present and future standing of 
"the world than older subjects in the sam-pIe. They were 
-the most sceptical about peace proposals. 
Galtung is credited with having established the 
conceptual dimensions of "negative peace" and "positive 
peace II • The former he defined as absence of organised 
violence or war be"tween groups or nations. Peace is 
, 
here seen as a state of passivity and absence of contacts 
between such groups or nations. The latter concept is 
defined as something like co-operation patterns, and aims 
at integration between groups or nations. Peace in this 
context is seen more as an active process, where contacts 
are exchanged and activity is expressed. Galtung believed 
that it was important to differentiate between these two 
concepts because he did not consider peace to be merely 
the absence of war. 
In 1968, Shal1crass administered to New Zealand 
schools a questionnaire which was patterned after the 
Mankind 2000 Project. He found that over half of the 
sample of 600 sixth formers thought about the future of 
the world and talked and read about it. Only 11% had a 
very pessimistic view for themselves, their country, and 
the world. Generally, opinion was optimistic, although 
23% thought people would be less happy, 48% thought 
families would become less a"ttached, 26% thought there 
15 
would be s job satisfaction, and 25% thought that 
there would be lesspersonal kindness in future. 
This sample revealed that students we~e cynical about 
science and its ability to influence what ,\.yere seen as 
important elements in Ii On the question of the 
possible influence of science on peace, 83% hoped it 
would have a positive luence, but only 10% Jchought 
it would be effective. The gap between hope and 
expectation was large. On the likelihood of nuclear 
war, 38% believed that there would be a world war within 
20 however, 30% believed that total disarmament 
was possible. Given there was a war, however, 80% 
. 
bel that there would be total destruction or, at 
best, irreparable losses. Only 15% believed -that New 
Zealand could stay out of a world war. Forty per cent 
believed that there could be justification for conven-
tional warfare and only 36% could see no justification 
for Vlar. In terms of nuclear war, however, 68% 
believed it was unjustified. 
Shallcrass found his 1968 sample to be sceptical 
of peace propositions, and females were significantly 
more pessimistic than ,,'lere males. Nevertheless, females 
expected to exercise increasing control of own 
lives where males thought there would be more external 
control. Females were more concerned for the general 
good than for the individual good, whereas males reversed 
this choice. Shallcrass suggested that although 
pessimistic, the female pro may be more stic 
given the big political issues. Generally, though, 
there was an overwhelming enthusiasm for and 
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strong support for those policies ~hich were 
expressions of hope. 
A cross-cultural comparison of British and 
Japanese youth was undertaken, by Cooper '(1965). About 
350 young people aged 7-16 w'ere asked to relate their 
images of "war" and IIpeace ll • He considered that 
children less than 7 years old would not have an aware-
ness of war and peace, but by 8 years old, that their 
images would be fairly defined., His results from 
interviews indicated that "peace" prompted fe\-ver responses 
than Ilwar", ,that justification for war grew more 
necessary with age, and that fewer females than males 
believed war is justi.fiable. More females believed 
that war is more likely and that they would survive it. 
By age 11-13, youth seemed to be aware of the destructive 
effects of a nuclear conflict, but nevertheless felt 
somehow that they would escape it. Inf ac'c, Cooper 
identified a tendency at all ages for youth to subjec-
tively view their own personal probability of survival 
of a nuclear war as being better than others. weinstein 
(1980) has labelled this hopeful outlook on life as 
"unrealistic optimism", a bias which, he confirmed from 
studies \with an older age sample's perception of various 
life events. 
Japanese youth tended to differ from the British 
sample in that they were more aware of contemporary 
events, people, countries, and personalities than 
British youth. ~apanese youth tended to have a more 
concrete concern with war weapons, were less concerned 
,)' ' 
with fighting and were more vehemently against war. 
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They were preoccupied with peace and activities which 
actively expressed more protest and anti-war 
associations. Japanese respondents were more optimistic 
about the future of nuclear energy, less likely to 
predict a war in the future and were more preoccupied 
with peace as an international movement, compared with 
British youth. The results were consistent with certain 
findings about attitudes as reported by Galtun'g (1969). 
Rlvik (1968) replicate4 Cooper's investigation in 
part, having dropped what were considered to be provocative 
questions. o . In interviews with'170 Norwegian'youth, Alvlk 
concluded that older ones make more use of available 
f, 
sources of information concerning war and peace. with 
age, the subjects increasingly made more use of all the 
sources mentioned to them. Young people from higher 
socio-economic levels tended to.converse with their 
parents more. However, the main. agents for socialisation 
were the media. Socio-economic background seemed to 
playa greater role for youth with higher abilities in 
reciprocal reasoning, but not· with utilisation of 
available sources. Rlvik indicated that reciprocal 
reasoning as well· as the type of socio"':"economic background 
played ari important role in the moral judgment of 'ivar. 
Rosell (1968) conducted an exploratory- study in 
Sweden in the same year,' patterned after Cooper and 
1\1 vik 's studies. He found from his sample of 200 that 
females mentioned more about war consequences and less 
about war processes" while males were the opposite. 
His ,subjects perceived peace as the negation of war, a 
.,)'. 
trend which is supported in other studies. While 
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female "\vill to defend II tendencies increased with age 
\!'lhen their family was concerned, male "will to defend" 
friends decreased with age. His results confirmed 
i terns in Cooper and lh vik 's research 'l.vi th the dimensions 
of war being perceived mainly as "war processes" and 
"consequences". The concept of "peace"'l.vas mainly 
perceived as a state of stillness or~silence and not as 
an active process towards integration. 
Kramer, K:alick and Milburn (1983) examined respon-
ses to nuclear-related survey items from 1945'-1982. 
They found that one indicator of public concern regarding 
nuclear weapons was the amount of public opinion polling 
on the subject at different points in time. In fact, 
there was a significant positive correlation between 
their item count and a count of .magazine articles con-
cerning nuclear items over the years. Peaks in item 
counts corresponded to the. initial AmeriGan use of 
atomic bombs (1945) ; the Soviet acquisition of the 
hydrogen bomb (1953); the cold war crises of the early 
1960's; and anti-nuclear political activity in the West 
(from 1981 onwards). Lowther (1973) correlated first-
year university students' sense of powerlessness 
regarding nuclear weapons with their feelings of 
complacency on the subject. However, apart from this 
Kansas study, and a task force formed by the American 
Psychiatric Association in 1977, research which tapped 
on nuclear attitudes was noticeably lacking in the 
1970's. Consequently, this literature review resumes 
with current studies which have taken form in the 
1980's. 
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2.5 YOUTH RESEARCH FINDINGS IN THE 1980's 
Tizard (1984) outlined a fairly' extensive review 
of developmental research on young people's understanding 
of nuclear issues in the 1980's while highlighting 
problematic aspects of such research. Studies which 
she has already examined will only be referred to in 
brief. 
In 1977, the American Psychiatric Association 
formed a task force to look at the nphychosocial Aspects 
of Nuclear Developments ll • Between 1978 and 1980, 
questionnaires were administered to approximately lPOO 
students aged TO-18, from Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia 
and Los Angeles in the United States. More detailed 
responses were obtained through questionnaires and 
discussions wfth 100 students aged 1 18. In this very 
widely-cited study by Beardslee and Mack (1982), more 
than 50% of one sample surveyed thought that a nuclear 
war was possible and the great majority did not believe 
that they could survive a nuclear attack. They reported 
that the possibility of nuclear war had affected their 
plans for marriage' or having children. The interviews 
revealed uncertainty, anxiety, helplessness· and a sense 
. 
of hopelessness about -the future. There was also much 
sadness, cynicism and bitterness among these adolescents, 
owing to a lack of trust of adult society, as well as 
being faced with the prospect of inheriting a world 
verging on doom. 
Other recent investigations involving both 
qu~:stionnaire and interview studies have supported these 
findings - that many young people are aware of the threat 
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of nuclear war .and live in fear of it (Bachman, 1983; 
Chivian et al., 1985; Chivian and Snow, 1983; 
Escalona, 1982; Goldberg et al., 1985; 'Goldenring and 
Doctor, 1985; Goodman et al., 1983; Gray and Valentine, 
1984; Holmborg and Bergstrom, 1984 f : Mack, 1981; Hann 
and Digby, 1984; Schwebel and Schwebel, 1982; Smith, 
1982; Solantaus et al., 1984, 1985). Further, there 
is evidence that preoccupation with these issues among 
youth has increased' over time. According' to Bachman. 
(19a3), in 1975, 7%~f about 20,000 10~17 yea~ olds 
polled in 130 schools around the United states said that 
they often worried 'about the chance of' nuclear war; 
whereas in 1982, the corresponding figure was over 31%. 
In the A.rnerican Psychiatric Task.Force Report, 
Beardslee. and .~1ack suggested that adolescent personality 
development may be distorted by.fears of imminent 
annihilation. .. Healthy ?evelopment, they argued, 
depended on an adolescent's ability to reduce disappoint-
ments by looking forward to a future time in which they 
might possess what cannot be had now. An individual's 
establishment of enduring values depends upon the delay 
of present satisfaction in favour of. future goals. But 
they suggested that: " ... such development is compromised 
in a settinQ (wher~) a future appears to have been 
destroyed by the adults to whom its preservation (has 
been) entrusted" (1982, pp.90-9l). Escalona wrote: 
"To the extent that the present functioning of society 
conveys to our (youth) a picture of ••• withdrawal, of 
fear ..• towards other nations, ••• to that extent the 
effects of the nuclear peril upon us also affects the 
development of. (youth)" (1982, pp. 6067607). 
\ 
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The Institute of Social Research at the University 
of Michigan administered to high schools across the 
United States a. survey entitled, "I'-1.onitoring the Future" 
(Smi th, 1982). The questionnaire included the following 
questions: "Of all the problems facing the nation today, 
how often do you worry about the following?" Problems 
addressed in the questionnaire included "crime and 
violence ll , tleconomic problems ll,. "race relations.", and 
IIchance of nuclear war". Students responded by choosing 
between "never" and "seldoni", "sometimes" or "often". 
Over an 8 year period,.the proportion of the sample of 
16-19,000 senior high students who often worried about 
the chance of nuclear war increased fourfold. If the 
categories are collapsed to include "sometimes", the 
trend goes from 40% to 64%. In response to the state-
ment, liMy guess is that this country will be caught up 
in a major world upheaval in the next 10 yearsl,~, 43% of 
the males and 21% of the females agreed. In response 
to the statement, "Nuclear or biological annihilation 
will probably be the fate of all mankind within my 
lifetime", one-third agreed. Citing the Michigan 
Institute of Social Research data, Yankelovich (1982) 
linked the shift specifically to the perceived threat 
of nuclear war and the sense of futurelessness ,that 
results from it. An associate of Yankelovich, 
Elisabeth Noelle~Neumann, reported tha,t "no future" was 
a widespread slogar:- among young people in vJest Germany. 
Similarly, Yankelovich reported despair, gloom and a 
.I . .' 
sense of grimness in west Germany, Sweden, Britain, 
throughout Weste:r::n Europe and the United states. 
He related that the mood of the fu·ture 'was very 
threatening - one of shortages, greater,difficulty 
and a closing in of horizons. 
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The data from the United Stat~s tends to dominate 
'che literature vdth many of the conclusions having a 
similar mood of distress and disillusionment. The 
United States' research may in part .be a reflection of 
the researchers' emphasis, but it may also'show that 
young people may differin~umerous ways, not least of 
all by their nationality and experience. It has been 
found that some. studies undertaken outside of the 
United states have some differing conclusions. 
Indications from Elder (1965) and more recently 
from Tizard (1984, 1986 } have suggested that· in spite 
of the studies' conclusions, there is still very little 
scienti c evidence to support such claims. Elder 
cautioned making generalisation or basing belief on 
logical inference. He wrote: "We forget that our 
(youth) are maturing in a world which to us is bizarre 
but to them commonplace. (Young people) accept the 
world as they find it, and, lacking the broad perspec-
tive of adults, do not.have the same basis for anxiety" 
(1965, p. l23). Tizard said that.al,though the assump-
tions (about how youth are reacting) seem reasonable, 
that there is difficulty with accurately assessing this 
n impactu. 
problems. 
She is concerned with these,methodological 
The remaining research studies are arguably 
no more rigorous in their assessments; however, they 
do offer differing results, which set them apart. 
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Chi vian, X1ack, Waletzky, Lazar~ff, 'Doctor and 
Goldenring (1985) undertook a study of 540 Soviet 
subjects to be compared with an age-matchl3d Californian 
sample of 900. Soviet adolescents were found 'co possess 
optimism quite contrary to other survey research. This 
attitude in no way discounted their unanimous concern 
that the prospects of a nuclear war were very disturbing, 
but they were of the opinion that nuclear war would not 
eventuate. By comparison, the majority of Goldenring 
and Doctor's Californian sample expressedmuch'pessimism 
about the future. These same pessimistic adolescents 
were found to be the most mature and be'tter academically 
of their group, contrary to earlier research that found 
"brighter" students to be the more optimistic (Schwebel, 
1965). The Soviet optimism may be attrib"l,ltable to their 
invol vement in peace-related activities - ." an observation 
made by Goldberg and her colleagues in a recent Canao.ian 
study. 
Goldberg, LaCombe, Levinson, Parker, Ross and 
Sommers (1985) considered that while their data indicated 
that thinking about. nuclear issues does appear to elicit 
many worries in young people, it was pos.sible that the 
very asking' of such questions stimulated m0re' anxiety 
and worry than students actually experienced in their 
everyday lives. Consequently, the direct questioning 
strategy may in fact be creating the anxiety it is 
supposed to be measuring. 
With this in mind, an open-ended questionnaire 
was designed incorporating questions modelled after the 
Californian/Soviet study and a Finnish study which had 
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been conducted just prior to their research .. The survey 
was administered to 2,,000 Ontario·subjects, divided into 
two samples. The first sample was carr~d out in 
... 
metropolitan high schools, half of which were comprised 
of immigrant groups (Chinese, Italian and Portuguese) 
and the other half of which were Canadian-born. The 
( .. 
second sample were largely English-speaking Caucasians 
of middle and lower socio-economic status." The findings 
indicated that the nuclear threat was a fu·ture concern. 
Nuclear war was spontaneously mentioned by over half of 
both samples, .but it was suggested that the concern with 
the threat of nuclear war was not more intrusive than 
other worries and did not necessarily lead subjects to 
foreclose their personal futures. Nevertheless, a large 
group were classified as .helpless, with an inability to 
express their fears. Only a minority were. willing to 
acknowledge their anxieties. This minority group was 
also optimistic that .constructive. action could. be taken, 
and had a stronger sense of personal and social efficacy 
than the rest. . In ,fact, those· who were most often 
fearful and anxiousabout.the threat of nuclear war were 
also those who felt the least helpless, whereas those 
who said they had not felt fearful. and .anxious also 
expressed the stronges.t. feelings of helplessness. Socio-
economic status was not a determinant of whether or not 
students w0rJ:ied about nuclear war . However, it was 
concluded that those who worried most about nuclear war 
also worried most about personal plans. 
In an on-going Finnish study, worries about 
nuclear war were placed in a broader context by using a 
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general health questionnaire to ask 5,600 students 
throughout Finland about the future. Solantaus, 
Rimpela and Taipale (1984) and Solantaus, Rimpela and 
Rahkonen (1985) confirmed that a large.percentage of 
, 
their samples. mentioned fear of war; although~ older 
subjects expressed more optimism and ideC!_s, vfhich were 
efficacious. Fears of war and hopes for'peace declined 
with age, with the former largely outweighing any 
c'. 
projected hopes £orpeace. Females expressed stronger 
" 
fears of war.than males and like Rosell (1968), females 
were more concerned with \varconsequences than processes. 
There were also interesting socio-economic differences 
in their sample. While Coles (1984) suggested that 
preoccupation with the threat of nuclear war was a 
middle-class issue that did not affect the lower socio-
economic class, Solantaus found that the highest (upper 
white collar) and the lowest (unskilled worker) groups 
(a) thought about 'i{far the most, (b) discussed war and 
peace the most, and (c) were most optimistic about their 
own possibilities to prevent war. These findings 
contrast \vith Croake and Knox (1973) whose lower socio-
economic group of subjects reported significantly more 
political fear than the upper socio...,economic status 
group. Blackwell and Gessner (1984) found that Negro 
young people were more fearful' and pessimistic than 
Caucasian youth, but it is not clear whether this may 
be an ethnic rather than a class difference. 
Possibly of most current interest, Solantaus and 
RimpeHa (in press) confirmed that those who had 
discussed issues of war and peace with others were more 
confident in their own ability to contribute to the 
prevention of war. Thinking and anxiety tended·to 
correlate positively with confidence. Their datt.a 
suggested that these discussions support these youth 
in facing up to the anxiety and in coping with the 
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situation by social action. other findings" were that 
subjects had increased hope in areas concerning \vork, 
education, human relations and material aspects of Ii 
and·these hopes became more frequent with ag~. Solantaus 
implied that this· increase in areas of personal concern 
was due· to the phase in adolescence preoccupi.ed with such 
issues. The Melbourne study which follows has come to 
similar conclusions. 
A~ielbourne . study by McMurray and Prior (1985) 
looked at 100 Australian adolescents' level of involve-
ment in nuclear issues.by specifically focusing on how 
they answered a question asked in three different ways 
(open-ended, picked from a list and closed .... response type) • 
They found clear inconsistencies in response to these 
items, confirming that the way in which a question 
asked important. * It waS clear from their question-
naires that for the majority of the subjects, other 
problems \were seen as more important to them than nuclear 
issues. A large majority of their sample were optimistic 
about the.future, suggesting that Australian youth may 
feel geographically "safe". While one-third of their 
sample did report feeling anxious about nuclear issues, 
their anxiety appea;t"ed not to affect their outlook for 
* Galvin (1986) reported a similar finding from an 
opinion poll conducted by the Defence Committee of 
Inquiry in New Zealand. 
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the future. As occurred with some of the older Finnish 
youth, they expressed involvement in more eg0centri!c 
issues of immediate concern. With respect to'efficacy 
expectations, students who had had peace studies il'\" 
schools were distinct and different from the rest. It 
appeared that with ,increased awareness comes also an 
increased sense of self-efficacy. This final 
conclusion was shared by the Canadian, FinnisTh and 
Soviet studies. 
Results from another Australian study, however, 
have some differing, conclusions. Mann and Digby (1984) 
conducted open...,ended interviews with over 300 Sydney 
young people wh0 were decidedly more pessimistic, with 
over half spontaneously mentioning'nuclear war as a major 
concern. Their expectations of the 'future indicated 
that they felt angry, fearful and helpless. Two-thirds 
believed that nuclear war was likely to happen and even 
more of the sample expected another v10rld ,war. This 
sample was found tohave'a reasonable level of knowledge 
about the destructive power of nuclear weapons even 
though the average age level was younger than the 
Melbourne sample. Mann and Digby concluded that their 
results 'go against the preconceptions ,that, in general, 
youth (and specifically Australian youth) are not aware 
of or affected ,by political issues. Their results 
suggested that Australians are not insulated from such 
influences by geography, history or complagency. 
A New Zeala~d study by Gray and Valentine (1984) 
indicated that a sample of nearly 900 students were 
~: 
poorly informed and lacking knov171edge about nuclear 
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issues, even though nearly all admi"tted to having seen, 
heard or read something about nuclear weapons. The 
majority wanted to know more about the issues ;raised, 
however, and were not apathetic. Nearly one-quarter 
predicted a vmrld war by 2000 A.D. and very few believed 
that arms reduction was possible. Generally, femq.les 
were more pessimistic than males, with males justifying 
war more readily. Eight .per cent believed that~ nuclear 
war could be justified with 31% believing that there was 
nothing New Zealand could. do to prevent it. "This is 
not to discount those who offered a wide range of 
suggestions as to what could be done to prevent nuclear 
war. 
Compared with Shallcrass (1968) and Shallcrass 
and Gavriel (1982), Gray and Valent-ine's results were low 
for those who believed that there would be a. world war, 
but similar in terms. of the possibility of arms reduction. 
Shallcrass and Gavriel's 1982 sample were only half as 
likely to believe that partial or total disarmament was 
possible compared with the 1968 sample and over one-fifth 
thought nuclear \1Tar could be justified (which is' more 
than three times those who believed similarly in 1968) . 
The 1982\sample of 600 revealed a marked increase in 
uncertainty about policies that were held.in some hope in 
1968, with more reservations about the future and a 
tendency towards more self-centredness -away from 
concern for the general good. In fact, while these New 
) 
Zealand studies indicated'a general pessimistic trend 
and uncertainty, Shallcrass and Gavriel maintained that 
there ,,"as still strong support and enthusiasm for peace 
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proposals, even if these adolescents vlere sceptical. 
These researchers noted that some of the data \vere 'open 
to interpretation. This fact has plaguedat~itude 
research'in this area since its outset. 
Some other New Zealand research findings by'raylor, 
Patten and Chung (in press) are similar to the Finnish 
study. Even the most pessimistic of their sam121e were 
not entirely despondent, even though one-quarte~ thought 
that nuclear war was likely, over half thought that New 
Zealand would not survive one and nearly three-quarters 
thought that there was little that they could do about 
it. What seemed most important was that ,subjects \v-ere 
not resigned to inactivity in the matter. Those 
subjects who worried either frequently; or all the time 
about nuclear warfare aZso felt more able to do something 
to prevent such a war. In another study, Prior, Patten, 
Mellsop, Taylor and Wagemaker (in press) found that those 
subjects who were more worried about the nuclear threat 
also talked more about it \1i th others - results vlhichare 
consistent with the Canadian, Finnish ,and Soviet data. 
Although it might be assumed that Jewish and Arab 
young people might have very differing 'atti'cudes and 
future expectations, Spielmann (19,86) has found many 
simi'larities. Unlike findings by Cooper (1965), 1\lvik 
(1968) and Rosell (1968), Israeli youth of both ethnic 
groups have projected more active than passive attitudes 
about peace. This researqh was based on compositions 
from over ~200 essCl-Ys about "Though-ts about Peace". 
Ne~~rtheless, with increasing age, peace was seen generally 
as an unrealistic ideal of doubtful desirability. Younger 
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age groups expressed more scepticism about the possi-
bility of peace. Similar to previous studies, these 
young people believed that it was something beyond their 
own influence or control, and that peace has a price. 
Newcombe (1986) believed that the threat of, 
nuclear war (and accidents) was significantly related to 
psychological distress and may disturb normal 
maturational development. Given this, assumption, he 
devised a nuclear attitudes questionnaire (NAQ) in order 
to better measure young adults· concern, support, fear 
and denial which'together he claimed represented a second 
order construct of anxiety. Findings indicated that 
females, who sat the NAQ were more 'concerned,. less 
supportive of nuclear~related advancemel,1ts, more fearful 
of the future, however, expressed less denial. Newcombe 
found that nuclear anxiety was associated with less 
purpose in life, more depression, more d,rug use I less 
satisfaction and more powerlessness. 
Many attitudes and emotions have surfaced from 
the literature, with fear and anxiety '(accompanied\by 
associated helplessness and hopelessness) gen~rally being 
the most pronounced expressions, followed by a more self-
centred group who seem to be either apathetic or 
psychologically numbed. By comparison, little appears 
in the literature about those youth who feel angry and 
incensed at the world situation. Goldenring and Doctor 
(1984) reported such attitudes and J'.1ann ant;! Digby (1984) 
also made mention of anger as one of several reactions 
to the threat of nuclear war . Beardslee and Mack (1982) 
.,;' 
and, previously, Schwebel (1965) had cited bitterness 
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among youth .. Gray and Valentine (1984) quoted excerpts 
from comments which included:· lilt .gives you a feel of 
hate for those people who play with these dangerous 
toYS ... 1I and "I really hate nuclear weapons." Further 
confirmation of angry feelings comes from a study by 
Holmborg and Bergstrom (1984). Swedish young. people 
I 
aged 13-15 thought that adults were very little concerned 
about the nuclear threat, and these particular 
adolescents felt quite angry about this lack. of concern. 
This sample rated nuclear war as their greate~st worry, 
out of a choice of fourteen items, and over.one-quarter 
of these youth expected nuclear war.in their lifetime. 
Considering that this younger adolescent age'group were, 
according to the other research, a group.most commonly 
cited as feeling fearful, helpless cand hopeless, this 
Swedish sample together with some recent findings about 
adolescents from the Uni tedSta'ces, Australia and Ne'\rJ 
Zealand convey an emotional reactionwhich'Sandman and 
Valenti (1986) believed has useful channels for action -
energy for actiontha t is othenlise· bound up in fear or 
depression. What makes Holmborg. and Bergstrom's general 
findings different is the focus on this mode of dealing 
with the\threat of.nuclear war. 
In the present study, with respect to a New 
Zealand·sample of young people, it proved possible to 
examine both the New Zealand and some overseas findings 
relating to adolescents' attitudes and opin.:i-ons towards 
nuclear issues.. After investigating the findings, the 
present study hoped to determine whether these youth are 
affected in ways similar or counter to the literature. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 RATIONALE 
This study is part of a field of research progres-
sing along the lines of work begun under. the direc'tion of 
/ 
Johan Galtung (1966) of the University of Oslo. Similar 
research has subsequently been conducted in New Zealand 
by Jack Shallcrass (1968, 1982), Victoria University of 
Wellington. Drs Ben Gray and John Valentine (1984) of 
the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear 
War have also published results from a New Z-ealand survey 
which they conducted in North Island secondary schools. 
This study proposed to comp.are political attitudes 
and opinions of adolescents to establish their awareness 
of, or knowledge of nuclear issuE~s in particular. The 
study aimed to follow a strategy similar to-other New 
Ze.aland studies, while extending' the scope of the research 
into adolescentpolLtical attitudes. It was also intended 
that the results obtained from this study might be 
comparable with results obtained by other investigators 
in New Z.ealand, Australia and the northern hemisphere. 
This study hoped to reflect current issues, concerns and 
the level of political consciousness of the subjects 
surveyed, and planned to examine implications for school 
curriculum studies. No hypotheses were formulated 
because the research was undertaken as an exploratory 
empirical study to advance knowledge. 
~. . 
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3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
There is a growing amount of research dealing with 
adolescent atti tudes tovvards war, peace and nuclear 
issues.. However, few of the studies can be compared 
. directly due to the differing forms' o·f measurement and 
methodology employed. The' study reported here atten;lpts 
to replicate, in part, certain. aspects of previous 
research, in order that inter-study comparisons might be 
made. To this end, asocial ,survey design was used, 
incorporating a subject-administered questionnaire. 
3.2.1 The Study-Design Stage 
Having decided to conduct a survey,a porulation 
in the South' Island was required. A district with four 
schools comprising varying socio-economic groupings and 
backgrounds was approached. 
3.2.2. Anticipat0ry.Data Analysis 
A larger sampling of.the population was manageable 
due to the str~cturing of the questionnaire. No open-
ended questions were included. Instead, a series of 
closed-response it~ms in the form of attitudinal+y-scaled 
and forced-choice questions were used. These provided a 
·uniform frame of reference for respondents to use in 
determining 'their answers to each question. statistical 
analysis could then be tabulated and age/sex/school 
comparisons could be made. 
3.3 THE SOCIAL SURVEY 
3.3.1 The Pilot Study 
A pilot.study was constructed and tested in an 
attempt to investiga-tethe specific areas of research 
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and to scrutinise the wording of questions to be included 
in the survey. Several revisions were required to 
clarify ambiguities. The final revision of the 
questionnaire was administered to a pilot sample of 10 
subjects. I-t vms determined that comprehension of 
items was satisfactory and that the average time taken 
for completion was about 20 minutes, which was 
considered practicable. 
The questions included were items which 
- looked at the subjec-t I s present attitudes and 
opinions about various issues, 
- were relatively easy to administer and compu-te 
(closed-response type), and 
were considered to be appropriate for the 
subject population. 
3.3.2 The Questionnaire 
A 10 page questionnaire (see Appendix I) comprised 
the social survey. The questibnnairewas designed to 
elicit information about the respondent's level of po 
itical awareness, attitudes and opi~ions towards nuclear 
issues in particular, and New Zealand's political 
prospects in world affairs generally. The questionnaire 
consisted of 4 sections: 
ta} The first section contained 20 questions 
t'lhich were intended to gauge the subject's attitude 
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towards the future in relation to themselves, their 
country and the world; whether they believed human 
destructiveness was innately determined or not and 
whether they expected nuclear conflict as an inevitable 
scenario. They were asked about their expectations 
and \vhether or not )chey were optimistic about the 
fu·cure. A 7 point equal-appearing scale was used in 
this section because it had the advantage of rendering 
finer distinctions beb..reen subjects according to the 
attitudes which they possessed. In the analysis of 
data, the scale has been collapsed to 4 categories: 
ATTITUDE (1 - 2) - yes I very much 
(3 .4) - moderately more 
(5 - 6} - moderately less 
(7 - not at all; or 
e.g. My Zife will be better in 15 years. 
(agreement) 
(agteement) 
(agreement) 
(disagreement) 
ATTITUDE 1 - 7 
(b) The second section of 30 questions asked 
more directly about what they knew about nuclear issues; 
where they obtained their information;. if they thought 
conventional or nuclear warfare could-be justified; 
whether the prospects of a nuclear conflict would affect 
their fU,ture plans; whether they approved of New Zealand's 
ban on nuclear ship visits; whether they ever dreamt 
about nuclear war or would want to survive it if it 
happened, as well as questions perti:tining to the super-
powers' determination to arms reduction. Subjects were 
once aqain asked to think about the future - this time 
in tenns of peace, co-operation and less conflict between 
countries. 'A checklist and categorical response mode 
was used in this section. 
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e.g. Does New Zealand itself have anv foreign enemies? 
yIN 
(c) The third section was patterned after 
Sidanius (l976) and Jamieson (1978) incorpora"ting 34 
items which had been generated bv a sample of independen'c 
assessors from politically-opposed organisatioris. It 
was intended to establish a scaling format which· might 
measure and/or.havethe discriminative power to index 
conservative beliefs, values and attitudes. A three-
response category mode was used, and the scale content 
was divided between positively and negatively keyed 
i"tems. The subjects were asked to rate each of the 
items by responding "yes" if they had a positive' 
reaction, "?" if they were unsure·or had no opinion, 
or "no" if they had a negative reaction to "the. item. 
Conservative.responses were "211 points, "?" rated 11111, 
and non-conserva"ti ve responses were scored II 0 II • Four 
items in section III were not discriminative, leaving 
a total of 30 items to be scaled.* 
e.g. A.N.Z.U.S. (Australia/N.Z./U.S.A. Treaty) Y /? IN 
to.} The final section contained 2 questions 
pertaini\ng to demographic details~ with space provided 
for personal comments. Comments were optional, however, 
and not required. 
* 30 points = non-conservative 
30 points = indifferent (no political persuasion} 
30 points = conservative 
Neutral statements/questions serving as filler items 
are marked with (*) in Appendix I. 
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3.4 SUBJECTS 
Data w'ere obtained from 570 subjects, as shown 
in Table I, of which 287 were males and 283 were 
females. The age the subjects ranged from 13 -18 
years, the largest group being aged 15 - 16. For 
computational purposes, subjects were grouped as 
13 - 14, 15 - 16, and 1 7 - 18. This grouping tended to 
correspond fairly precisely with their form levels 
(IV, V, VI-VII). The sample population from 4 
different schools in a South Island district came from 
non-streamed academically mixed classes of students 
of various socio-economic backgrounds with no 
particular group or social class dominating. 
TABLE I: Distribution of Subjects, by SEX and AGE 
within each of the 4 SCHOOLS+ 
SCHOOL 
age 
SUBJECTS 
cf 
sex 
« 
TOTAL 
+SSG 
RUR 
SUB 
SSB 
SSG RUR 
'<:j< ~ co '<:j< ~ co 
r-I r-I r-I r-I r-I r-I 
I I I I I I 
M lli r-- M lli r--
r-I r-I r-I H r-I r-I 
- 15 15 
- 15 15 6 
30 30 - 15 15 
30 30 16 15 15 
136 132 
single-sex girls' 
rural 
suburban 
single-sex boys' 
6 
SUB SSB 
o::t' ~ co '<:j< ~ co 
r-I r-I r-I r-I r-I r-I 
I I I I I I 
M lli r-- M lli r--
r-I ....; r-I r-I r-I r-I 
-
15 15 15 - 30 30 
15 15 7 30 30 19 
15 15 15 
15 'is 6 -
; 
163 139 
TOTAL 
287 
283 
570 
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The secondary schools included a rural co-
educational group of 132 students, a suburban co-
educational group of 163, and two single-sex urban 
schools of 139 male and 136 female students' respectively. 
The rural co-:--educational high school had a studen"t 
population of over 1,000 in 1985. The school serviced 
the local community and surrounding farming/horticultural 
areas. The suburban co-educational high school of over 
1,000 students compris.ed residents (mainly) from the 
I 
local neighbourhood of state housing as well as execut±ve-
classed homes. The two single-sex high schools, located 
central city, were surrounded by an executive-classed 
neighbourhood. These two schools each had populations 
of just under 1,000, the lower forms in each being 
private tuition, with boarders comprising q PQrtion of 
each school's roll. 
3.5 PROCEDURE 
Permission to conduct the survey was granted by 
the District Senior Inspector of Educa'cion (Wellington). 
The principal of each high school was 90ntacted 
initially by letter and subsequently by telephone to 
arrange :for an appointment to discuss the ,feasibility 
of asking students to complete the questionnaire. A 
copy of the questionnaire was usual,ly perused in detail 
before arrangements were made. At least two forms 
from each age level at each school were approached 
(with the consent of the class teacher-in-charge) in 
orcler that approximately equal sample sizes might be 
obtained for later comparison. 
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3.5.1 Setting 
This s.tudy attempted to attain some degree of 
external validity by using an educational setting to 
conduct research. students were approached in a group 
setting 1 . either in their classroom or in an assembly 
hall (supplied with desIcs) •. In the assembly hall 
setting, students' preparatory period was partially 
utilised. Generally, however, actual classtime was 
allotted from regularly scheduled English, History pr 
Social Studies classes. The "familiar" setting for 
the subjects lent a studious atmosphere. 
3.5.2 Distribution and Collection 
The questionnaire ,'las distributed among subjects 
from Forms IV - VII during late September through early 
October 1985. The attending teacher/couns~llor made 
introductions, after which the author invited students 
to complete the questionnaire. Participation in the 
survey was voluntary. 
The following s·tatement was included with the 
instructions: 
This survey takes about 20 minutes and is part of 
research which will be compared with other students 
your own age here in New Zealand and overseas. 
Your comments, ideas and criticisms are welcomed. 
You may write bet''ITeen the lines or at the end of 
the survey if you wish. 
One clarification to the instructions in Section I, 
before you begin: 
if you DISAGREE with the statement, tick '7', 
otherwise tick from 'I' - '6', depending on 
how much you agree with the statement. 
You will be informed of the results of this survey 
through the College, if you are interested. 
Very few questions arose from subjects during 
the completion of the questionnaire apart from some of 
the youngest age group \..rho required some· clarification 
of meaning of words used. in Section' III. Respondents 
found the first section of questions quick and easy to 
complete. In Section II, a forced-choice format 
imposed a more structured response mode., and together 
wi th Section III, required more knmvledge of the issues. 
Respondents were descriptive in their.replies if 
questions were not easily answered. Generally, these 
comments were constructive, i.e. positive. Written 
comments will be considered in the Discussion section. 
Questionnaires were collected as completed. 
Reactions from subjects indicated that items in the 
guestionnairehad raised considerable interest. 
Subjects were later debriefed and school admLnistrators 
were each sent letters of appreciation for having 
granted permission to conduct the survey_ 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The results presented in this chapter are both 
qualitative and quantitative in content. In,the follow-
ing sections, the data analysis is explained. Responses 
to the questions were analysed and tested for consistent 
patterns by chi .... square. contingency tables. Paired t-
tests were used to determine if there. were regular trends 
between the ordered multi-st.ate responses. A summary ,Of 
the main findings from the questionnaire is followed by 
comparisons with other research findings in New Zealand 
and Australia, as well as in the northern hemisphere. 
4.2 DATA' ANALYSIS 
The BMDP (1983) statistical software computer 
package was used to analyse the data generated from the 
questionnaire. Firstly, a frequency count for every item 
in the questionnaire was obtained. Respopses to questions 
, .' 
\vere analysed in terms of age, sex and school and 
consistent patterns within or association b~tween responses 
were tested by correlating select variables with each 
other using, chi-square tests, with Yates' qorrelation where 
applicable. )'c Paired t-tests were ,ysed on appropriately 
scaled variables to test for significant differences. 
Finally, because of the possibility ofint~r-correlations 
between sex and school (approximately half of the sample 
..;--: 
* Factor analysis was not employed due to the nature 
of the questionnaire construction, i.e. varying response 
category coding. 
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comprised single-sex schools), stepwise logistic regres-
sions were used -to select what were taken to be the most 
important predictor variables, determining the subject's 
responses to questions. The p-value~to-enter was set at 
0.05, the p-value~to-removewas set at 0.05, and the 
tolerance for the multiple regression analyses was set 
at 0.0001. 
Graphs. and histograms were produced by the Plot 79 
package for the Burroughs B6900 machine, using the 
Hewlett-Packard plotter. 
4.3 RESPONSE RATE 
Of .the 629 questionnaires completed, 59 were 
incomplete, i.e. either subjects missed a page or had not 
completed demographic details. A response rate of better 
than 90% for the survey was still maintained. Only 10 
subjects (less than 2%) responded in what will be classi-
fied as a t'negative ll or destructive fashion. This type 
of response indicated that the survey was a waste of time 
or that the subjec-c was apathetic about the issues. 
Generally, however, there was an active participation, 
judging by the variety of responses and descriptive 
entries: A total of 381 respondents made further comments 
on their questionnaire, drew relevant pictQrial images or 
sought further information from the author by leaving 
their name and address on the final page. Lower forms 
were more inquiring, partially due to the political 
terminology .in Seetion III, but mostly interested to 
share with others their own impressions. 
Of the nearly 67% of responden-ts who made some 
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additional written reaction or comment, over 65% were 
classified as what will be termed "positive ,l or 
constructive. "Positive" examples include: 
ilThanks for asking us what we think." 
III think we should be told more about nuclear issues 
and what life would be like afterwards, so we can 
help avoid it." 
"Nuclear war is stupid. It would ruin the world 
and everything growing. 1I 
"Nuclear war really sucks.. Reagan is a'l.1ar monger. ,I 
"NO one can win a nuclear war!" (Over 28% (107) of 
respondents who made comments included this opinion 
or a variation of it.) 
France was cited as Ne'l.v Zealand's enemy by 16.5% (63). 
U.S.A. was cited as New Zealand's enemy by 1.8% (7). 
U.S.S.R. was cited as New Zealand's enemy by 0.5% (2). 
No other country was specifically mentioned for this 
question. 
\, Negative II examples by respondents include: 
"Thanks for wasting my free period! 
time to finish my assignment." 
IIWho cares?" 
II I ha'ce surveys!" 
Now I won't have 
In Section II of the questionnaire, some subjects 
found the .forced~choice format was too limiting. With 
some of the questions in this section, respondents inserted 
their own cqlumns or explained in writing why the question 
was difficult to answer. In the most no"table instance 
(Q. 26, "Would you want to be a survivor of a nuclear "war? ") 
about 4% (24) could not give a yes/no answer to that 
question. Genera;Lly, their answers were lengthy, based 
on .... ;the complexity of their thinJdng. Other difficult 
questions and the percentages who did not limit themselves 
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to a forced choice response were: 
Q.7 ,I Do you think non-nuclear warfare can ever 
be justified? II 3% 
Q.9 II Do you think nuclear weapons are an 
effective deterrent to nuclear war? 11 4% 
Q.ll "Would you let· the prospects of a nuclear war 
affect your plans to ever have children? II '2% 
Q.14 II Do you. feel more secure without nuclear-
powered ship visits?" 2% 
Q.17 II Does New Zealand itself have any foreign 
enemies?" 3% 
4.4 GENERAL FINDINGS 
The results from this survey of adolescents indicate 
that the. respondents are concerned about nuclear threat 
issues, if lacking- detailed knowledge about them. vlliile 
two-thirds of the sample express pessimism about the future 
for humanity and nearly half believe that nuclear war is 
likely in the future, on a more personal level there is 
optimism for their own futures. Wri-tten comments by many 
of the respondents indicate that there is a sense of social 
efficacy (rather than feelings of helplessness or hopeless-
ness)." Respondents appear to be living on two levels of 
) 
thought; .one where they are disillusioned with events in 
the wider international realm and another where they 
express plaJ?-s indicative of future personal direction, 
with positive prospects. 
4.5 SURVEY RESULTS INCLUDING SEX AND AGE DIFFEP~NCES 
The majority of respondents clearly believe that 
tKeir own personal lives will be better in 15 years; 
however, less are so sure about whether their lives will 
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be better than their parents' lives have been. There is 
a significant trend of pessimism when the subjects are 
asked to think about their own life in the future -
compared with life in New Zealand [t(569 df) = 8.6, 
< 0.001] - compared with life on earth [t(569 df) = 8.2, 
< 0.001] . A paired t-test indicates that when subjects 
, 
are asked to think about the quality of life on earth in 
15 years, they were least optimistic about their forecast. 
There was a consistent effect in terms of these t-test 
combinations that subjects were marginally more optimistic 
about what life will .be like in their own country in 15 
years, but most subjects think positively about their own 
life in 15 years. Nearly 83% are opportunistic in think-
ingthatthe prospects of a nuclear war would not affect 
their career plans. 
Significant differences arose between males (26%) 
and females (44%). as to what affect the prospects of a 
nuclear 'ltlar would have on whether they would have children 
[X2{1 df) = 19.94, p < 0.001]. This concern increased 
[' 
with age as shown in Figure I. Nearly 40%· of the 17-18 
year olds compared with only about 25% of the 13-14 year 
olds believed that they would be affected [X2 (2 df) = 7.9, 
12. < 0 .05.] . Generally, more females (47%) than males (32%) , 
thought /that their own lives would not be any better than 
2 
currently [X (3. df) = 19.64, < 0.001] and that their 
parents' lives have been better than they can expect theirs 
2 to be [females: 38%, males: 23%r X (3 df) = 19.64, 
p (0.001]. 
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Ninety-six per cent of respondents thought that 
humans clearly cause e nvironmental damage which is 
irreversible and only 3% believed that nuclear testing in 
the Pacific is harmless. Over 60 % firmly believed that 
aggression and violence are innately pre-determined in 
the human species. This might account for the subjects 
who did not believe that individual people, social groups 
or countries could help to prevent a nuclear war. In 
fact, nearly 10 % thought that there was nothing at all 
that a small country like New Zealand could do to help 
prevent a nuclear war, compared with signi ficantly more 
(over 15 %) who thought that individual people had no 
influence [t (569 df) = 8.41, P < 0.001]. Some of those 
respondents who believed that individuals may have 
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influence qualified their answer by stating that such 
people would have to be superpower leaders - not just 
\i ordinary" people. Small groups of people (like peace 
groups) gained significantly more support than individuals 
for being able to help prevent nuclear war [t(569 df) = 
9~59, p < 0.001]. Only about 8% had no confidence in 
what influence small groups of people might have towards 
achieving peace. 
with nearly half of the sample believing that 
nuclear war is likely and about three-quarters of the 
sample strongly agreeing that any future world war would 
be nuclear, the data presented thus far may indicate 
pessimism. In fact, females do consistently hold more 
pessimistic views on most of the above-mentioned issues, 
excepting where life on earth in the future is concerned. 
Females had a slightiy more optimistic viewpoint than their 
male counterparts on this sue [X2(3 CIf)= 9.49, 
<0.05]. Females were also not so ready, to accept that 
human beings are innately pre-determined to violence qnd 
, 
agression, while males more strongly believed that these 
characteristics are innately human [X2(3 df) = 23.72, 
p < 0 ~.001] • However, fewer females than males expected 
peace. arid co-operation between countries in thefutur~ 
2 . 
[X (1 df) =,9.86, ,12. < 0.01] and most females do not 
envisage less conflic.t between countries in the future 
[X2 (1 df) = 6.71, <0.01]. Nearly 30% of females, as 
opposed to less than 18% of males, claimed to have dreams 
or nightmares about. nuclear weapons or war [X2 (1 df) = 
9.3~, P < 0.01] • 
.,r. .-
Thirteen and 14 year olds were twice as optimistic 
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as older subjects about future peace [X2 (2 df) = 9.61, 
E < 0.01], and considerably more of them agreed that 
there would be less conflict in the future [X2 (2 df) = 
9.94, P < 0.01]. The 13-14 year olds were also the most 
likely to believe that nuclear weapons were effective 
deterrents [X2(2 df) = 9.34, p < 0.01] and that'nuclear 
weapons could be used on a limited bas{s [X 2 (2 df) = 6.35, 
p < 0.05]. There were no sex differences regarding thls 
latter.item or future peace prospects. The 15 .... 16 year 
olds were the most anti-nuclear weapons in their replies, 
and also the least optimistic about conflict reduction in 
the future [X2 (2 df) = 9.94, E < 0.01] as shown in Figure 
II. One female wrote ,that she wanted to survive in order 
to help build a better world " all the destruction 
and chaos ll - afi optimistic (?) approach to a very 
pessimistic forecast. 
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Overall, just under half of the respondents 
believed that New Zealand civil defence would be ill-
prepared for nuclear war in Australia and New Zealand. 
Nevertheless, awareness of New Zealand's lack of 
preparedness increased with age [X2 (6 df) = 25.57, 
p < 0.001]; and males of all ages were more knowledge-
able about civil defence limitations [X2 (5 df) = 27.21, 
p < 0.001], as shown in Figure III. Some 4 % of 
respondents thought that nuclear fallout information 
was on the back of their telephone book. 
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Two.-thirds ef the sample agreed very strengly that 
it would make very much difference to. them if they ceuld 
knew that there weuld never be a nuclear war. The 18 
year eld males were the mest indifferent to. this questien. 
Mere thana fifth ef these males said that itweuld make 
no. difference at all [X2 (5 df) == 22:15, £< 0.001]. 
Knewledge abeut nuclear issues was fairly dispersed 
in the sample. It weuld be importapt to mention, hewever,· 
tha)c respendents readily indicated that they had net been 
told eneugh about nuclear pelicies and issues which they 
believed would directly invel ve 'chem. and their future. 
seventy-five per cent ef the sample desired to. knevl mere 
abeut the issues raised in the survey. 
All but 5 respendents eut ef the sample ef570 
claimed to. have had an awareness ef nuclear issues, 
altheugh less than 60% had studied oJ(eut them in scheel, 
excepting the 77% ef 13-14 year eld males who. said that 
they had [X2 (5 df) 13.13, p < 0.05]. Slightly mere ef 
the sample claimed t:e have studiedabeut war, but this 
still· leaves ene-third who. said that they had net studied 
abeut w.ar in scheel. Less than 40% had studiedabeut 
peace. The elder subjects were· less likely than the 
yeunger ones to. have studied abeut war [X2 (2 df) == 10.45, 
I 2 ~< 0.01], peace [X (2 df) = 10.03,p < 0.01] er nuclear 
issues [X2 (2 df) == 10.75, l? < 0.01], as shewn in Figure IV. 
In spite ef their limited knewledge the issues, ever 
85% ef the 13-14 year elds were receptive to. and 
interested in learning mere abeut nuclear issues. The 
cemments ef this age greup were the mest celourful and 
lacked t.he pessimism ef elder aged subjects. 
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Although 26% knew all of the countries which have 
their own nuclear weapons and 79% could indicate which had 
used them on a population of another country, only about 
5% of respondents answered both of these questions 
correc·tly. From Table II it can be seen that signifi-
can·tly more. males than females got the two questions 
coq::'ect [X2 (1 ) = 6.69, p < O. 01] • Hmvever, this is 
not to discount those who considered France to have \I used" 
nuclear weapons. in the Pacific and Britain in Australia. 
Both of these nuclear nations have subjected populations 
in this part of the world to nuclear testing. It is 
worth noting here that nearly 100% of the sample knew that 
the U.S.A. and th~ U.S.S.R. have nuclear weapons, over 90% 
knew that France has, over 75% were aware that Britain 
a· nuclear nation, and over half of the sample included 
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China. Israel, a country most recently disclosed as 
\1 unofficially II having their own nuclear weapons, was 
mentioned by 21%. 
TABLE II: 
. + 
Sex Distribution of Correct Answers 
to Knowledge Questions** 
RIGHT WRONG TOTAL 
N % N % N ~ 0 
cf (22) 4 
<; 
(265 ) 47 (287 ) 51 
<;> (8) > 1 (275) 48 (283) 49 
TOTAL (30) (540 ) (570 ) 
+Answers to 2 questions: 
(a) Which countries have their own nuclear weapons? 
, \ (and) 
(b) Which have ,dropped nuclear weapons on the 
population of another country? 
** p < 0.01 
Tests consistent patterns within responses of 
each subject showed that the U.S.S.R. had an edge over the 
U. S .A. wi'ch more than 8% of respondents believing that the 
U.S.S.R. could win a nuclear war instead of the U.S.A., 
compared with only about 3% who believed that the U.S.A. 
could win instead the U.S.S.R. [X2 (1 df) = 239.33, 
p < O.OQl]. These beliefs decreased with age [X2(6 df) = 
21. 76, p < 0.01]. Nearly 75% claimed that neither super-
power could win, and some commented that "win I' was an 
irrational concept when considering' this issue, as 
mentioned previously. Nearly 26% believed that the 
U.S.S.R. rather than the U.S.A. (19%) was prepared to 
2 . 
reduGe arms [X (1 df) = 17.17, < 0.001]. Almost 43% 
",: 
of respondents believed that the U.S.A. was more likely 
than the U.S.S.R. to launch a first~strike attack, but 
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. 2 
there were not significant differences by age [X (2 df) == 
2.11, £> 001] or by sex [X 2 (1 df) == 2.88, E.> 0 .. 051. 
Below are "cwo-way frequency tables indicating the 
associations between select questions. Apparently, 43% 
of respondents noi only expect a nuclear war but also 
accept (in varying degrees) their own thinking about this 
[X 2 (1 df) == 8.32, P < 0.01] as shown in Table III. Thirty-
fi ve per cen-c believed that there will be a nuclear war 
2 
and, in addition, do not want to survive it [X (ldf) = 
0.16, ~> 0.5]. See Table. IV. This' accounts for the 
majority (75%) of those respondents who believe that 
there is going to be a nuclear war. 
TABLE III: Two-way Frequency Table of Variables**_ 
"Easy to accept own expectations" 
yes no 
N % N % N 
yes (289) 51 (11) 2 (300) 
no (244) 43 (26) 5 (270 ) 
570 = 
** <0.01 
TOTAL 
TABLE IV: Two-way Frequency Table of Variables# 
"Desire to be a survivor of a nuclear war" 
yes no 
N % N % N 
yes (70) 13 (219 ) 40 ( 289) 
no (66) 12 (191) 35 (257) 
546 TOTAL 
#E. > 0.05 (NS) 
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In Figure V, significantly more females (86 %) than 
males (65 %) said that they did no t want to survive if 
there was a nuclear war [X2 (1 df) = 32. 39, p < 0.001]; 
however, this difference does not a ppear un-til age 15- 16 
[X2 (5 d f ) = 46.94, £ <0.001]. 
FIG V:SEX/AGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS WHO DISAGREE WITH QUESTION *** 
"Would you wan t t o be a s urvi vor of a n uc l ear war? " 
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Less than 3% of the sample did not want to k now 
more abouJc nuclear issues while a -t the same time they 
could justify nuclear war [X2 (1 df) = 0.05, E> 0.5] and 
nuclear weapons on a limited basis [X2(1 df) = 1.5, 
p> 0.1], and believed that nuclear war was predic-ted in 
the Bible [X2 (1 df) = 7.56, E< 0.01]. See Tables V, 
VI, and VII. Forty-six per cent of t h e sample believed 
that New Zealand had enemies. France was mentioned most 
o ften here, followe d by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. 
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Reagan appeared .by name as an enemy without reluctance, 
whereas Mitterrand and Gorbachev never appeared.by name. 
TABLE V: Two-way Frequency Table of variables# 
IIJustification for nuclear war" 
::: 
(J) !1l 
H (J) yes no o ::1 
I=l !1l N % N % N !1l 
~-..-I 
0 yes (52) 9 (370) 67 ( 422) s:: H 
..'4m (J) (18 ) 3 (114) 21 (129) . 0 r-! no 
.J..lO 
::1 (J) s:: 5?J.. TOTAL H 
-..-I .J..l 
#E. > !1l ::1 0.05 (NS) (J)O 
~~ 
TABLE VI: Two-way Frequency Table of variables# 
"Desirability of nuclear weapons on a 
Q) !1l limited basis" 
H (J) 
~ ~ yes no !1l 
~-..-I N % N % ~. N 
0 
~ H 
..'4m yes (36) 7 (385) 70 (421) (J) 
Or-! 
.J..lO (16) 3 (116) 21 (132) ::1 no (J) s:: 
H 
-..-I .J..l 553 = TOTAL !1l ::t # (J) 0 P > 0.05 (NS) ~~ 
TABLE VII: Two-way Frequency Table of Variables** 
"the Bible predicts nuclear war" 
H 
0 
4-1 yes no 
s:: N % N % N 
0 
-..-I :: 
.J..lH yes (14) m m 3 (46) 9 (60) 
o ~ ."',' 
-..-I no (180) 37 (250) 51 (430 ) 4-11-1 
• ..-1 m 
.J..l(J) 490 = TOTAL !1lr-! 
::t 0 
1J::t 
**p < 0.01 :: s:: 
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Respondents indicated more with increasing age that 
\ 2 '. 
the Bible predicts nuclear war [X (2 df) = 6.56, P <0.05] 
- a situation which may account for older subjects who 
were only half as likely to believe that peace and 
co-operation would happen in their lifetime [X2(2 df) = 
9.61, p < 0.01]. 
Although 68% felt positively towards A.N.Z.U.S. 
(Australia/New Zealand/U.S.A. Treaty Alliance), approval 
( 
of the government's ban on:nuclear powered and armed ships 
2 -
was supported by over 66% of the sample [X' (1 df) = 127.68" 
12. < 0.001]. There was significantly higher female th9.n 
male approval on this latter issue of nuclear ship bans 
2 [X (1 df) = 21.79, < 0.001], with only about 13%~of tlie 
sample disagreeing, wi th it. An additional 19% of the 
sample would 'permi t nuclear pmvered ships in port, if 
unarmed. See Table VIII. More females (of all 
felt more secure without nuclear ship visits than males 
[X2 (5 df) ~ 14.34, 12.< 0.05]. Nevertheless, this sense 
of security decreased with age as shown in Figure VI. 
TABLE VIII: Two-way Frequency Table of Variabl.es*** 
"Approval on ban of nuclear.,;.al'med ships" 
:: 
Ul 
O! yes no 4-1 -.-I 
0.G N % N % N Ul 
I=l 
ro""d yes (366) 66 ( 11) 2 ( 377) 
,Q\\) 
N 
I=l \\) (107) 19 (69) ·13 (176) 0::'3 no 
Cl 
r-f~ 
cdl 
:> 1-1 553 = TOTAL 
o ro 
1-1 (J) 
***p 0.001 O!r-I 
0-1 U 
F'l:l::S 
::: I=l 
FIG VI:SEX/AGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS TO QUESTION '" 
"Do you feel more secure without nuclear ships visiting 
N.Z. ports?" 
80 ,----,-----,------,----,-----,-----,----,,----, 
w 70 
w 
0:: 
~ 60 
o 
::r:: 
5: 50 
~ 
~ 
2 40 
lL. 
o 
W 30 
o 
~ 
z 
W 20 
o 
0:: 
W 
CL 10 
13 · 14 
dB 
~tEI 
*£<0.05 
15 '16 
SEX/AGE 
17 ' 18 
57 
Thirteen per cent of respondents were not at all 
hopeful about their e xpectations of the future and over 
66 % proclaimed to be pessimistic about the future. 
There was a general acceptance (73 %) of their own 
expectations in spite of these beliefs. 
Television was the most frequently cited source 
and most believable source responsible for informing 
subjects about nuclear issues. In Figure VII is a 
breakdown of information sources and whether these same 
sources were considered to be believable. It can be 
seen that teachers rate higher than parents by about 
10 %, but both teachers and parents rate very low on 
credibili ty, compared \'I7i th media source s. 
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4.6 THE CONSERVATIVE SCALE 
In Section III of the questionnaire, subjects were 
asked to rate the items listed according to whether they 
had a positive, negative or indifferent reaction. The 
items consisted of politically-loaded terms and phrases 
which had ,been rated as such by independent assessors (see 
3.3.2 (c)). Table IX shows that the majority (52%) of 
the subjects were found to be indifferent, according to 
the scale. However, a large proportion (ne~rly 43%) were 
non-conservative in, their rating of political items. Only 
marginally more than 5% of the total sample rated items 
conservatively; that is to say ,they indioated a posi-tive 
preference for politically conservative items. 
, 
TABLE IX: Conservative Scale Ratings of Score+,s 
'LEFT' '.[I.UDD' I RIGHT' + TOTAL 
N % N 0' '(5 N 
SCORERS (244) 43 (295) 52 ( 31) 
+'LEFT' = non-conservative 
'MIDD' = indifferent/no opinion 
'RIGHT' = conservative 
) 
% N 
5 (570 ) 
% 
100 
T~is section of the questionnaire served as a check 
for agreement response-bias. When conservative scoring 
" 
was correlated with another item. in the questionnaire "'Which 
'had been rated similarly by indepenaent assessors, 
respondents were found to be answering the items fairly 
consistently, an indication that acquiescence had not 
occurred. In Table X, over 70% of the respondents whose 
"': 
political point of view was conservative (i.e. 'RIGHT') 
answered consistently on another conservative item 
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[X2(6 df} =50.86,12< 0.001]. 
TABLE X: Two-wayF:tequency Table of Variables*** 
'LEFT' I ]4IDD' IRIGHT I + 
Ul 
0.. N % N % N % N 4-1 .,., 
o..c 
Ul (174) I=i yes (195) 80 59 (9 ) 29 378 co "0 
,.0 a> 
H 
I=i a> no (45 ) 18 elll) 38 (22 ) 71 178 0 ~ 
0 
..-1 0.. 
co I ? (4) 2 (9) 3 13 ;:.. H 
o co 
H a> (294) 0....-1 TOTAL (244) 100 100 ( 31) 100 569 o..u 
< ::I 
::: I=i 
+'LEFT I = non~conservative 
'MIDD' = indifferent/no opinion 
'RIGHT' = conservative 
***p < 0.001 
Figure VIII compares responden-ts ratings by sex I 
age and school. Significant differences 
the distribution of conservative respondents. 
found in 
Male's 
were more than 3 times as likely as females to have 
scored ,conservatively [X2 (2 df) = 18.32, < 0.001]; 
and the boys I college (the only school involving 
compulsory military training) rate4 significantly higher 
with conservative scorers [X2 (6 df) = 22.31, p < 0.01] 
compared with the other schools. It must be remembered, 
however, that the sample size was small, thus diminishing 
the significance of these results. 
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4.7 COMPAP~TIVE STUDIES - NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA 
It was intended that research by Shallcrass (1968) 
Shallcrass and Gavriel (1982) and Gray and Valentine 
(1984) should serve as models for this study since ·they 
had conducted similar research in New Zealand recently . 
In many respects, the New Zealand research findings are 
similar to each other. However, in other areas, 
findings are quite different. 
The research samples by Shallcr ass came from 
Wellington, were longitudinal in scope and were adminis-
tered to six th formers only. These f actors differentiate 
his results from this particular study . Gray and 
Valentine's subjects came from the Taranak i region and 
because their samp le included forms V, VI and VII, their 
resul ts may be more direc·tly comparable. In 1968 , when 
Wellington six th formers were asked by Shallcrass about 
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the likelihood of nuclear war, 38% confirmed it compared 
with 65% in 1982. This study obtained results half-way 
between these two figul?es,. Compared with Gray and 
Valentine ~ s 23%, however r .this study IS results were high. 
LOoking at the Cal likelihood of nuclear war 
impacting on New Zealand {if conflict originates in the 
northern hemisphere} and (bl certainty about a third world 
war being nuclear, there was considerable agreement with 
the Taranaki sample. The majority of New Zealand 
subjects believed both. of these statements to be true. 
The Taranaki research said that New. Zealand was at 
a greater disadvantage to help prevent a nuclear war than 
this survey indicated, however. Their sample was more 
than 3 times as likely to believe that a smaller country 
like New Zealand coulq not help. Over half o£ their 
sample also placed no confidence in individual people 
\ 
having any influence. Similarly, Shallprass reported 
increased diffidence about how effective one person could 
be, from 21% in 1968 to 4Q% in 1982 - much. higher results 
than this sample I· S 15%. Whereas the majority of the 
Wellington sample were still cautiously optimistic, the 
Taranaki 'survey showed .a pessimistic'outlook with few of 
the sample believing that they had any power to prevent 
what they were forecasting.* While results are open to 
J 
some interpretation, as Shallcrass concedes, this survey 
tends to lean towards his findings thus far. 
The media was rated as the most important inform-
ation source for sqeing, hearing or reading about nuclear 
*.,1" The Taranaki sample had a female/male ratio of 2;1. 
This may partially explain why the results were so pessi-
mistic Cas females tend to hold more pessimistic views). 
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issues, according to New Zealand samples. Television 
y.las the most widely qi ted influence. Gray and Valentine 
did not give teachers or parents a .mention so it is 
assumed that they were not highly regarded,' as was the 
case in this sample. Only 33% of their sample claimed 
to have studied about nuclear issues in school, compared 
with nearly double that in this study. The majority of 
their subjects thought that they had not been told enough 
and this study confirms. that they desired to know more 
about nuclear issues. 
Both the Taranaki and Wellington 'samples largely 
believed that conventional warfare could be justified, 
compared with this study's 32%. Half of Gray and 
Valentine's'sarrrple and 46% of Shallcrass' sixth formers 
could justify it (although his gures were up from 36% 
in ,1968) • .On the justification for nuclear warfare, 21% 
(1982) up from 15% (1968) of the Wellingtcm group,' 8% of 
the Taranaki samp.le· and 12% of this study.agreed that it 
could be. The Taranaki sample and this study showed that 
significantly more males than females agreed with the 
justification of war in any form. 
This survey' ssample and Taranaki's gToup were 
found to'lack .knowledge of nuclear issues when asked which 
countries out of a list have nuclear \.Ileapons. The U.S..A. 
and the U.S.S.R. were known to have them by most of the 
Taranaki sample (97% and 98% respectively) and by this 
study (over 99%) • Knowledge regarding other countries' 
possession was mucl). less accurate. Only 70% of the 
Taranaki sample knew that France had nuclear weapons 
">' 
compared with nearly 92% of this study. 
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Gray and Valentine claimed.that females tended to 
know less about nuclear-related matters and this was 
confirmed .by this study. Likewise, Taranaki females 
weremore.pessimisticthantheir male counterparts. 
Although this study confirmed the same, as did Shallcrass' 
results, he elaborated that even though the female 
profile may be more pessimistic, it may also be one of 
realism. 
ShallcrassandGavriel remarked that generally 
there was overwhelming enthusiasm for peace and s·trong 
support for those general proposals. which were expressions 
of hope. Gray and Valentine indicated that·tl1eir 
subjects were .. pessimistic about the future of the vvorld 
and few of them believed ·that they had any power to prevent 
, 
destruction. Nevertheless, half of their sample said that 
their kn0wledge of nuclear war did not affect their 
attitude to life at all. These attitudes (which might 
be labelled anywhere from helpless-to .... apat.hy-to-denial) 
generally were not reflective of the results obtained from 
this survey,. On the contrary, more,positive and 
constructive·replies . pervaded this survey's general 
outlook, in line with Shallcrass' findings. 
A\Wellingt0n study by Taylor and others (in press) 
related findings which suggest. a sense .. of social efficac}l 
as evidenced in this New Zealand study. Apparently, 
students who said they worried the most frequently about 
nuclear warfare were also those who felt more able to do 
something to preve~t such a war. Their respondents were 
no!-, resigned to inactivity and from qualitative comments 
in this study, similar findings were apparent. Rather 
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than feelings of helplessness or hopelessness, the 
Wellington study and this study revealed subjects who 
were despairing but not despondent. Only 25% of their 
respondents thought that nuclear war was likely to occur. 
Considering that nearly half of this sample believed 
similarly, the sense of efficacy may be even more 
pronounced. A comparable large majority could not 
j ust.ify nuclear warfare. 
Turning to recent research in Australia, a Sydney 
study by Mann .and Digby (1984) showed results similar to 
New Zealand studies and in agreement with some northern 
hemisphere.research - specifically,' Escalona (1965, 1982) 
whose sample came from a similar age group. From the 
survey of Sydney children, 64% compared with this study's 
47%be1ieved.that nuclear war was likely and .77% th.at 
-t.here would be another world war •. Over 46% had essen-
tially pessimistic expectations and perceived thE! future 
as threatening. Over 66% of this study expressed 
pessimism about th~ future when asked directly. 
McMurray and Prior (1985) conducted research in 
Melbourne schools where it was agreed by 47% of their 
respondents that the nuclear issue was the mosJc important 
social problem today. Fifty per. cent believed that 
nuclear vTar was likely to occur in their' lifetime, 
comparable. with this New Zealand study's findings. 
Eighty-four per cent of the Melbourne sample claimed to 
be optimistic about the future, contrary to the Sydney 
sample and a direc.t reversal of findings from this New 
Ze."C\.land .study .. In other items, however,' there Vlere 
similarities with this study. Melbourne subjec·ts 
66 
attributed significantly more responsibility to others 
than to themselves (as confirmed by this study). They 
found that the way in which a·question is asked is 
important and this New .Zealand study confirmed the same, 
e.g. Section If 7 and 20. They found ·that· subjecJcs 
who had studied peace in school had more efficacious 
expectations and attributions of responsibility. This 
New Zealand study partially confirmed this in that over 
one-third of the 13-14 year olds (who claimed to have had 
the most input in. school regarding peace. and nuclear 
issues) were most likely to also believe that peace and 
co-operation would happen between countries in their 
lifetime. This attitude was significantly higher (double, 
in fact) than -the rest of the sample ,who claimed not to 
have had peace or nuclear issues as often in s.choo1. 
There were not significant differences between age groups 
regarding whether an individual might be as effective as 
either a group or a country in preventing nuclear war. 
This might have lent further. support to McMurray and 
Prior's findings. In any case,. 60!l? of their sample 
approved of the New Zealand nuclear ship ban - very 
comparable with this survey's 66%. 
Returning to Mann and Digby's results, only 20-29% 
gave personal sources (parents, teachers, peers, etc.) as., 
... 
their means of finding out about nuclear issues. The 
mass media (television and radio) accounted for 51-77% of 
their informa-tion source and only 7% from newspapers and 
magazines. Remempering that this sample was comprised 
of , a younger age group, the similarities with this New 
./. 
Zealand study were nevertheless noJciceable for their lack 
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of emphasis on parents or teachers. The Sydney study 
was qualitative as well as quantitative in content. 
comments which resulted .from open-:-ended questions 
indicated that there was a reasonable level of knowledge 
about the destructive powers of nuclear weapons, that 
Australia could expect to be implicated in any future 
world war, and that devastation>and destruction would be 
the scenario ofa nuclear war. 'l'he respondents 
commented that a nuclear war could not be "won". Similar 
comments and attitudes reflect this New Zealand study. 
The Sydney sample clearly was against the assumptions 
which McMurray and. Prior made about the possibility that 
Australian children were naive and 1 geographically 
II safe". Mann and Digby's research indicated that their 
sample was not insulated from nuclear issues by gepgraphy, 
." 
history or complac.ency. They felt anger as a response to 
a perceived threatening future. This New Zealand study 
had similar conclusions. 
4.8 COMPAHATIVE STUDIES - NORTHERN HEMISPHERE 
Escalona (1962, 1963 and 196·5) and Schwebel (1965) 
were two of the earliest comparable studies from the 
United States which considered the effects of nuclear 
issues on young people. Beards and Mack (1982, 1983) 
have more recently contributed a SUbstantial amount of 
research on the impact of nuclear developments on children 
and adolescents. Escalona found that 70% of her sample 
spontaneously referred to war and peace as major concerns 
Schwebel (1965) said that: 44% expected war; 
it would definitely make a difference knowing that there 
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could never be a nuclear war; and, the prospects of 
nuclear war would affect their career plans and hopes 
for having a family. Details of percentages were not 
available, but these were put forward as majority opinions. 
Schwebel and Schwebel (1982) furthered these results with 
evidence from interviews that subjects were very anxious, 
scared, powerless , bitter, .mad and resentful. Their 
sample did not believe that they could survive a nuclear 
war. Younger subjects were more naive and fearful than 
older ones. Denial mechanisms. served to abate the' fears 
of some who were characterised, .asnarcissistic, self-
centred and apathetic •. The qQ.alitative,nature of these 
resul ts make direct comparative .. analysis. very difficult. 
However, it can be said that a measure of each of the 
attitudes as outlined by Escalona and Schwebel did apply 
to this survey_ The question remains as to what extent 
these attitudes reflect this New Zealand sample"s 
Adams. (1963) and Wade (1962) concluded that fear 
or anxiety" decreased with age and that attitudes and 
opinions changed.with age. Croake an,d Knox (19'73) 
" reported that fear'l.-'I1as associated more with younger than 
older subjects, and more with females and lowersocio-
economic status than with males and upper socio-economic 
status. The most frequently mentioned fears were 
political. This New Zealand survey agreed that younger 
subjects .were.more naive than older ones, and that females 
were more pessimistic than males - but and/or 
anxiety and socio .... ,economic sta-cus were not analysed. 
The Beardslee and Mack (1982, 1983) research was 
more quantitative and thus more easily comparable. 
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Longitudinal research indicated that there has been 
increasing expectation that annihilation will occur 
within onels lifetime, with the majbrity believing that 
nuclear \\lar was at least possible, with more indicating 
that it was likely, but in the distant future. The 
majority of their sample thought that civil defence 
preparations were worthwhile even though, in one survey, 
only 4% believed that their city could survive a nuclear 
attack. It may be th.at their subjects were more 
knowledgeable about the effects C(f a nuclear exchange 
than this New Zealand sample (who agreed in 'varying 
degrees that this country could be prepared.for nuclear 
war) • On the other hand, the United St.ates sample 
showed unsophistication to suggest that bomb/fallout 
. ~ 
shelters would be a solution. This was not an option 
for the New Zealand sample, nor a consideration. The 
Beardslee and Mack res,earch conveyed. a deeply dipturbed 
and despairingly threatened group ,of young people who 
had a general unquiet or uneasiness about the future 
and about the present nature of nuclear weapons. 
Similar co:mnients and attitudes were reflected by some 
subjects in this New Zealand study, but with much more 
emphasis 'on personal efficacy and hope than being 
disturbed or despairing. Beard.slee and Mack stated 
that their subjects live on two levels: one where they 
think there will be no future and another where they are 
making plans as if there will be. 
New Zealand sample., 
This applied to this 
The news. media, particularly television, was cited 
as the main source of information by subjects in Beardslee 
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and Mack's survey. The classroom ranked second, 
indicating a difference from New Zealand studies. Over 
50% thought nuclear weapons were important for national 
security, compared with .1ess than a third of this survey. 
More than. half of their sample let nuclear 
developments affect their thoughts about marriage and 
their plans for the future.' Although it was not 
directly comparable, just over a third of .the New Zealand 
sample would let the prospects C\cffect their plans to have 
\ 
children. At all ages, Beards and Mack found females 
less . likely than miHes to believe that a, limited-scale 
nuclear exchange was possible without escalating. There 
were no sex differences in the New Zealand study; 
however, the 91% who believed that a limited exchange was 
not possible were much hi.gher than Beardslee and Mack I s 
results of 40-50%. 
Beardslee. and Mack indicated that there was a 
particular uncertainty and fear about nuclear war and the 
possibilities of survival. Ninety per cent in one survey 
thought that they wou1d.not survive. This w.fl:s in keeping 
with the general mood of the despairing research from the 
Uni'ced states 1 . a situation \-vhich did not have the same 
foundatIon· in this New Zealand .study. 
Their research did highlight a lack of knowledge 
which pervades most adolescent studies. r.!ack (1983) 
found that 30% of high school . students did not know which 
coun"try had used nuclear weapons in· war. This study's 
21% who did notknpw, was only marginally better. 
Chivian, Mack, together with Doctor, Go1denring and 
others (1985) researched a Soviet group of adolescents to 
be compared with an age-matched Californian sample. 
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The results suggested that lrJ'ith Soviet adolescents, 
there was a general optimism expressed by these Spviet 
respondents that was unfounded in other research. The 
Soviet sample were of the opinion that there would not be 
a nuclear war, even. though nuclear war was their greatest 
concern and 99% regarded the prospects of such an event 
as very disturbing. Goldenx:ing and Doctor found in their 
Californian sample that 72% regarded the prospects of 
nuclear war as very disturbing, with over 58% fearing it, 
and 42% believing that it would probably .occu-r. This 
compares wi th the New Zealand sample IS 47% •. Soviet 
1 
subjects were fairly unanimously convinced (more know-
ledgeable?): that civil defence measures were a useless 
undertaking; but they were much more positive about 
preventing nuclear war in the first place (three-quarters 
compared with just over a quarter of the Californian 
sample) • Soviet subjects believed that even children 
could help prevent the possibilities of nuclear vlar ever 
happening. Over 70% of this New Zealand study placed 
greatest confidence in groups of people or countries 
. ... 
(like New Zealand) helping to prevent 'nuclear war, with 
53% having confidence in individual people. 
Goldberg ·andothers (1985) conducted research 
involving over 2,000 Ontario sUbjects. Nuclear war was 
found to. be the most prominent worry for 51% and 55% who 
spontaneously mentioned this worry \'lhen asked, "When you 
think about the future, what do you most worry about?" 
Worry about. war de?reased with age I bu·t the more 
frequently subjects felt fearful and anxious about nuclear 
.,1': 
war, the more likely that they also felt that they had 
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some personal influence. The sample said Canada (as a 
country) had more influence than an individual in being 
able to help prevent' a nuclear war ~ similar findings to 
this New Zealand study. The majority of the sample were 
in favour of banning the manufacturing, and testing of 
nuclear ,weapons while at the same time supported N.A.T.O. 
This New Zealand study 'found a similar parallel between 
majority approval,of the government's antL-nuclear stance 
while also favouringA.N,.Z.U.S. 
Ca.nadian subjects claimed to talk most about the 
threat of nuclear war at'home, secondly with' friends, and 
rated school as their third most likely place where the' 
nuclear threat was discussed. From these results, it 
follows that parents' and teachers must have ,rated much 
higher as information sources for the Canadian subjects 
than for Jche New Zealand samples. A Finnish study to 
follow offers some comparisons with this Canadian study 
as well as the New Zealand sampl~. 
Like the Canadian study, Solant'aus, and his 
colleagues ',(1985) found that worry about war decreased 
~ 
with age, as results show from an extensive nationwide 
sampling in Finland. The threat of war was ,the most 
common source of fear for 81% of SUbjects. This may be 
surprising' ~onsidering that Finland is a neutral country, 
has no nucl.ear, weapons and no enemies, living at peaCe 
with her neighbours. In many respects, this country is 
similar socio-demographically to New Zealand, making 
cross-cultural comparisons interesting. 
In opposition to this New Zealand study's results, 
optimism increased wi th age. This was in: spite of 
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increased fears and anxieties .(in Finnish females) , and 
a general decline in hopes for peace (by both sexes) . 
Finnish males were most fearful at· age 12. Older 
subjects believed that individual people could have an 
influence in preventing nuclear war and optimism about 
. / 
prevention was .highest among the older subjects. There 
were no significant age differences found, in this New 
Zealand study relating itO optimism about .prevention. 
War and peace had been discussed by teachers in 57% 
of the secondary sch00ls and in 45%ofhigher'secortdary 
schools (equivalent to VI and VII forms). This compared 
with this New Zealand sample which. showed that war, peace 
and nuclear issues were not· considered to have been 
studied in school·. by older' students as. much as younger 
ones. With regard to justification for war, males 
supported the\activity more readily, whereas females were 
much more likely·to'reactwith anxiety. This was 
supported by other research and although this Ne'\,v 
Zealand . study did not attempt Jco measure anxiety, 
consistently , more males than females found justification 
for war. Fear or.anxiety was experienced by 37% of 
females and 15% of males in the Finnish study, and tended 
to increase with age. Thirteen per cent of Finnish 
females and 6% of males had nightmares. This was less 
than half of the New Zealand results, but was comparaole 
by the sex difference. 
Although it has been stated that hopes for peace 
decline. with age, ~he Finnish study established that 
optimism increased . 
.,,: 
If .11 optimism 'I can be compared with 
the belief that there will be less conflict (and) more 
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peace and co-operation between countries in future, then 
this New Zealand study found conflicting evidence. Older 
Finnish subjects felt more optimistic about their ability 
to influencecevents, and . although there was nothing 
comparable.to measure in this New. Zealand sample, older 
subjects did make qualitative,c6mmentsand expressed more 
ideas which suggested aspects of coping and'mastery. 
Cooper (1965) found that justification for war in 
a British sample increased with age; that females were 
less likely tocondbn-e such conflict, yet more believed 
that it was likely ,and that theywoula survive it,. even 
, 
though subjective probability that one could survive 
generallydecreased.with age. The belief in hostile 
instinctive motivations. increased with age. In this New 
Zealand study, there were sex differences but not age 
differences relating to innateness'of aggression ahd 
violence. Females were less likely to believe that war 
was justifiable .. and necessary or that humans were prone 
to aggression and violence; but there'were not 
significant sex differences relating to the likplihood of 
war. Females believed more with increasing age that it 
would not be desirable to survive a nuclear war, but the 
question\wasnot speculatively posed, . as in Cooper I s 
survey. 
A Norwegian case study by )\lvik (1968) cited that 
wi th increased age comes more utilisation.' of available 
sources of information about \I peace II and \'war" and that 
older ·subjects mad~ more use of these sources than younger 
on~p. This was confirmed by this New Zealand study if 
ease in completing the questionnaire is considered. The 
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youngest of this study's sample found some difficulty 
wi th political terms and issues.· Although parents did 
not rate highly at. all·in this study, they seemed to play 
a greater role (at higher socio-economic levels) according 
to 1\lvik. In the Norwegian study, the. main agents for 
socialisation .(rated before parents and other people) were 
newspapers, radio and television. On this item, the New 
Zealand study confirmed·. the findings. 
More recently, Holmborg and Bergstrom (1984) 
presented a paper on how young Swedish adolescents think 
and 1 concerning the nuclear ~threat.' The sample of 
41 schools concludeq that 42% of respondents mentioned 
the fear of nuclear war as their greatest worry and that 
females were more pessimistic about the future than males. 
This compares very clearly with the results from this 
New Zealand study. 
4.9 COMPARATIVE STUDIES - CONSERVATIVE SCALE 
Comparison of these results with other research is 
limited by the fact that no i tern-by-i tern analysis vvas 
undertaken in this study. Furnham (1985) showed numerous 
sex differences in socio-political beliefs from a sample 
of about 300 sixth formers, but suggested that perhaps 
sex is not such a powerful determinant of political views 
as Sidanius and Ekehan~ar (1980) and Ekehammar and 
Sidanius (1982} have demonstrated from their results. 
In New Zealand, mean scores for conservatism based on the 
use of the Wilson-Patterson C-Scale (Wilson, 1973) have 
J: • differed very little between males and females, but 1n 
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both sexes, scores tended to increase with age (Stacey, 
1977b) • Furnham and Gunter (1983) found that the best 
determinant of political knowledge was interest in 
politics. Additionally, sex and age were weakly 
related to political knowledge, but both in a predictable 
direc'cion: males having more political knowledge than 
females, and with increased age comes increased 
knowledge. What Furnllam cannot explain and finds 
inexplicable.is why females should be less conservative 
on most issues and yet have less interest.and knowledge 
of political affairs. In the present study,similar 
, 
conclusions. were reached; thus, these same questions 
could be raised. Males were found to be both 
, 
significantly more conservative and knowledgeable of 
c" the issues than females, and conservatism ~ncreased 
with age. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
It was the aim of this present study to ascertain 
whether adolescents had any formulated ideas or opinions 
about war, peace and nuclear issues. l\1any reactions 
have surfaced from the data, if s.ometimes poo,rly conveyed 
or lacking a deeper understanding. The level of know-
ledge varied greatly and there were differences not only 
between individuals, but also by sex and age. These 
results will be discussed with special emphasis on 
qualitative aspects of the data and th~ idiosyncrasies 
which relate to the New Zealand research. ' Further cross-
cultural comparisons will be made with studies from other 
" 
nations, and implications will be oonsidered. The 
limitations of the study and recommendations for future 
research will be discussed. 
' .. 
5.2 INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS WITH SEX AND AGE 
DIFFERENCES 
\ 
The research findings will be presented in terms 
of (1) political beliefs and conservatism, (2) cognitive 
reactions, (3) emotional reactions ,., and (4) political 
.~'-/ 
knowledge and the role of education. 
5.2.1 Political Beliefs and Conservatism 
It may be of considerable concern that while 47% 
if: 
of these New' Zealand adolescents' think nuclear war is 
likely in ·the future, 46% also perceive New Zealand as 
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having enemies. Bronfenbrenner (1961) has described 
this enemy concept as ila mirror image" and PIous and 
, 
Zimbardo U984} charactJerised a similar notion in their 
survey report, liThe Looking Glass Waril. The common 
features of the enemy concept include: 
They* are the aggressors. 
Their government exploits and deludes the people. 
The mass of their people are not really sympathet:ic 
to the regime. 
They cannot be trusted. 
Their policy verges on madness. 
, 
Bronfenbrenner suggested that distortions of this nature 
(as expressed by the "enemy" concept) have adaptive 
functions and are self-confirming not only for the 
military but for implementation of governm~nt policy. 
o 
In war, it is psychologically necessary to see the enemy 
as thoroughly evil in order to enhance one's own self 
image. Erikson (1985) coined "pseudospeciation" for the 
historical and cultural tendency to create a false sense 
of unique identity in groups and thus ignoring the 
genetic integrity of the human species. Boulding (1984) , 
said that the state is strengthened by saprificing its 
own soldiers, not by killing the enemy, that makes 
the enemy sacred. It becomes hypocratic and deeply 
pathological when love of country becomes hatred of 
enemy_ Volkan (1985) warned that the only ':'"lay harmful 
consequences of this manipulation can be avoided is by 
being consciously aware of the processes. .. Intellectual 
and moral strength are required to avoid the destructive 
*They or their meaning the "enemy" 
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implications of this psychological IIneedfor enemies ll • 
It could be argued that New Zealand has not felt 
very geopolitically vulnerable, historically has not 
experienced extensive defeat or suffering in waJ;, and 
has not been involved as a nation ,in international 
affairs compared with, say, west Germany. , I Listhaug 
Cl986) is correct, such factors can.be used to account 
for the differences between countries' assessment of 
likelihood of war, willingness to fight in war, fear of 
war, etc. From her findings, the united states feared 
war very strongly, but at the same time had a high 
proportion of its population .that were willing to defend 
the country. That the United state$ behaveddifcferently 
from 13 other nations throughout Europe. is not 
satisfactorily explained, considering the geographical 
vulnerability of, many European count.t ies •. It might be 
expected that.since. the United states has not historically 
I ' 
suffered extensive confrontation .by foreign invas,ion, that 
there would be a greater willingness to fight ..." the 
perception of war is geographically distant. ,_ But why do 
people in the United states fear war so strongly if this 
is the case? It may be that there is a strong manipul-
ation at>, play and that there is political propaganda 
within the American system which is built around the 
enemy image, enriched by comments about "an evil empire". 
This manipUlation might also explain why so many 
adolescents in the United states feel hopeless and 
\ 
helpless. They h~ve become paranoid through this 
indoctrination and not least of all by 'the bomb fallout 
.,;-,' 
shelter drills in their schools (which are as commonplace 
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to these young people as fire drills are to New Zealand 
youth} • 
Nevertheless, i.t appears fro~ ,this study's results 
that nearly half share at least some of this paranoia. 
It follows that since television has been such an 
/ ," 
important source of information for young people, this 
media must bear some accountability. 
In line with previous research (Easton and Dennis, 
1969; Furnham and Gunter, 1983; Greenstein, 1969; Hess 
and Torney, 1967; Hyman, 1959; Stradling, 1977) this 
present study found that males generally had a faster 
rate of politicization than females. Males expressed 
more justi cation' for. all types of warfare and claimed 
that knowing about nuclear issues did not affect their 
life as much. Males were also three times more likely 
to be conservative in their views than females. Furnham 
(l985) cannot clearly explain why this the case apart 
from interpreting why females may' be 'less conservative. 
Females are socialized into being more compassj}onate, 
concerned and nurturant, which in turn may suggest. social 
policies which are less conservative. Furnham indicates 
that the question of when and why sex differences in 
political\attitudes occur warrants further research and 
longitudinal .studiesmay provide clearer evidence. 
5.2.2 Cognitive Reactions 
The present data indicated that New Zealand 
adolescents were aware and concerned about nuclear 
issues • Females claimed more often than males that the 
.,>! 
knowledge of nuclear issues affected their attitudes to 
life and their plans to ever have children. Solantaus, 
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Rimpela and Rahkonen have explained: 
The military, technological and political knowledge 
of tflar is part of the male tradi tion. Men react 
to war. with activity. This builds among males an 
image of mastery of war, no matter how false this 
is in the nuclear age. This. might redu.ce overt 
anxiety about war. (Males) inherit this tradition 
through different channels,. the l.eqst impo:rtant of 
which is not the war games played by boys apd video 
and computer war games by the older .generation 0, 
In the female tradition, on the contrary, there is 
no mastery of war. v'Vomen I s activity during war 
has not been directed towards warfare., but towards 
preserving life on the home front. Women have also 
been passive objects of different social measures, 
like evacuation. During recent wars women have 
become increasingly victims of actual warfare. In 
the up-bringing of girls, female values of preserv-
ation of life are created .anew but there is little 
knowledge on the special mechanisms. 
/ 
This difference in relation to the mastery of war 
by males and females could explain part of the sex 
difference. Pre'ssure towards the traditional norms 
grows in adolescence, which contributes to the growth 
of sex difference after 12. 
(1985,.pp. 147-148) 
Stolte-Heiskanen (1971) has elucidated that sex differ-
ences have functioned to maintain the preyailingsociety 
and that, in order to maintain the status quo, females 
hav.e been discouraged from . participation in ppli tics 
generally or from developing a political cpnsciousness. 
Gilligan (1983) speculated that s~nce decisions 
\ 
about marriage. and having children. do not involve their 
parents "generation, young people feel they have more 
control over this particular issue than over career plans-
a sphere that they perceive to be more directly controlled 
by the adult generation. In this present study, opposing 
results were found. In fact, twice as many subjects 
indicated more co~trol over their career plans compared 
with those who felt similarly about having children. 
One 18 year old male, faced with a concern for the nuclear 
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threat, expressed the importance of pursuing his career 
in journalism despite subjugation: liMy career is 
paramount to me. I can help toward preventing nuclear 
war through my writing." Goldberg and her associates 
(1985) also confirmed that students felt more efficacious 
about their job/career plans, compared with oth,er" future 
concerns. It is another matter, however, as to how 
nai ve young people \vere to have such perceived control. 
Males were more inclined to view aggressive and 
violent behaviour as innate although both' sexes were 
highly conscious of the "limits" of hUman nature and 
social change, in line with findings by stacey (1978). 
Shallcrass and Gavriel (1982) reported a dogmatic 
minority within their sample of sixth form students. 
Religious believers tended to exhibit a greater. polaris-
ation of views than was evident in the non~believers. 
In this present study, there was a small group (3%) who 
were similarly dogmatic to a greater extent than the 
rest of the sample. Referring to Tables V, VI and VII 
(p. 55), this group did not want to know more about 
nuclear sues, advoca,ted the use of nuclear weapons, 
I 
could legitimate nuclear war and also believed that war 
was predicted in the Bible. The subjects within this 
group were ~ost likely to comment.: 
I'm not worried about what's, going to happen because 
I'm going to heaven. 
I know that my expectations are correct. I look 
forward to Jesus Christ returning to power and glory. 
All that is in the Bible is true and the ending of 
the world is PFophesised in Revelations. 
, From what I read, there is going to be a huge battle. 
At the time of the battle of Armageddon the Christians 
won ,. t be on earth. The earth will be the devil' s. 
Those left on earth will be the toys of the devil. 
Armageddon - the end times - prophesised in the 
Bible, are happening now. Wars and rumours of 
wars are an everyday even-t... The people alive 
now will witness the real sticky s.tuff of the 
end times. 
There was also a small group who thought that 
there was nothing individuals, groups of people or 
countries like New Zealand could do to help prevent a 
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nuclear war. This group comprised only about one-tenth 
of the total sample, however, which is low compared with 
other research findings, e.g. Gray and Valentine, 1984i 
Shallcrass and Gavriel, 1982i Solantaus et a1., 1985. 
The majority believed that prevention was possible and 
many commented in support of the anti-nuclear 
legislation by the New Zealand government. One 16 year 
old female replied: "If others followed our example, 
some real good might actual.ly be. achieved .•• instead of 
being apathetic." Other comments included: 
New Zealand is doing its best, but other countries 
should follow suit too. 
It is not pointless. It only takes one country 
like us tostart.a trend. 
I hope this government keeps up its policies.. New 
Zealand's anti-nuclear stand is a'positive step 
toward peace. Support a NUCLEAR FREE PACIFIC! 
5.2.3 Emotional Reactions 
The present data provided evidence that New Zealand 
adolescents were angry and incensed as they confronted 
the issues. They were not despondent, helpless or 
hopeless. Although the subjects were never directly 
asked about their feelings, many replied with comments 
which indicated tnat they were angry: 
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Nuclear war and the arms race .stink. It makes me 
wish I had never been born in these times. It is 
just hard to believe that such a. few MEN* hav€;: the 
control over whether you live or die. They have 
the ability to kill everyone! NO one. should have 
that power. 
U.S.A. can stick its warships up its arse. 
The superpowers. are very greedy and selfish. If 
only Americans thought .about other people instead 
of themselves all the time. Reagan should be 
shot. 
A"t the rate welre going, there won't be ·life on 
earth in 15 years, and that.makes me really angry_ 
It just seems so unfair, selfish and cruel (how 
one leader could push the button) • 
Old people like Reagan think war is grand. Old 
men shouldn't be world leaders. They have closed 
minds and are cOrrupted and power hungry. 
I hate Reagan. 
Reagan is really pathetic. 
The day the superpowers choose to use their war toys 
will be a sad day for all mankind. It's outrageous 
that they don't care. It's our wor.ld too. 
If France and the U.S.A. are our.allies, who needs 
. ? enem~es .. 
(Comments about these countries 
accompanied by adjectives ,like: 
"dorks", and "idiots".) 
were frequently 
"pricks"; "wankers", 
/' 
Chivian and others (l985} noted that their Soviet 
sample expressed very little anger. \The attitudes 
expre~sed from most other studies were Rargelymore 
fearful and anxious. Only a Swedish study, one Austra-
lian study, and O~JA~JW Zealand study have reported 
expressions of anger to some extent. 
Another attitude which cut a~ross many comments 
in the questionnaires from this study was one of cynicism. 
The data showed that although older subjects were more 
informed, they were also more cynical. The prevailing 
* Women were never mentioned as collaborators in the 
war machine and Thatcher's name never appeared. 
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theme of cynicism towards politics and politicians 
evidently develops at adolescence or later (Greenstein, 
1965i Jennings and Niemi, 1968). It made less 
difference to oldex subjects (particularly males). whether 
they knew that there. could actually never be a nuclear 
war. Similarly, older subjects did not wish to know 
more about nuclear issues as much as the youngesJc age 
group. * Older subjects (particularly females) were 
much less optimistic about. future peaee. These results 
contrast with Solantaus and his colleagues (I985) who 
. found that optimism increased with age. 
Levine (1981) claimed that narcissism is 
considered by some to be a hallmark of adolescence. 
Offering further confirmation, in thewhole.of Millicent 
Poole I. S Australian book YOUTH: EXPECTATIONS AND 
TRANSITIONS (1983) there is no mention of nuclear issues 
or global concerns. This might lend support to such 
views about youth in general, or· about Australian youth 
in particular, were. it not for Mann and Digby (1984) 
findings. From Tables III and IV (p. 52 ) it might also 
be claimed that an appreciable portion of respondents 
I 
I 
were fatalistic (or apathetic?), particularly since these 
* The rationale for some subjects not wanting to 
know more about nuclear .. issues may be for reasons other 
than cynicism, h.owever. For example, some of those who 
did not want to know more, qualified their answer with: 
The more I hear about nuclear weapons and war, 
the more I get scared. I'd rather not know! 
Knm'ling too mll;ch would scare me. 
1. would rather not know, because the more I 
know, the worse it seems. 
No, becaul;:re th.ere is nothing to be optimistic 
about. 
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resul ts account for the majority of those 'tvho believed 
that there is going to be a nuclear war. It seems 
appropriate here to cite Tyler and McGraw: II ••• it, is 
particularly important that citizens believe "they have 
an obligation to prevent war , and some\'1hatless important 
that they feel they can actually do so" (1983, p.37). 
I.n fact it was the case that, although the subjects were 
generally pessimistic about the future in light of the 
nuclear situation, on a more personal level, they 
expressed attitudes suggesting hope which might lead 
to action: 
The building up of arms for defence just provokes 
war. We need to support the united Nations to 
achieve a nuclear disarmament. 
Nuclear war doesn't decide whose right, only whose 
left. There is too much greed and materialism in 
the world. We must care more, share more and 
love humanity.. We won't be able to get by, 
otherwise. 
Patriotism breeds narrowmindedness. Love of 
country is dangerous if it goes to the extreme 
like in America. 
Peace begins with me really.* 
Similarly, Goldberg and her associates (1985) 
found that more concerned youth also believed they had 
some. personal influence. McMurray and rrior (1985) 
disclosed that efficacy expectations were strongly 
associated with a level of active involvement; that 
those students who had had peace studies in school 'tvere 
more ficacious. Generally, however, they claimed 
that egocentric issues were of more i~~ediate concern. 
Shallcrass and Gavriel (1982} have noticed an increased 
"shift to selfll as well. 
/: 
On the face of it, Levine may be correct about 
* Many subjects quoted "Imagine" by John Lennon 
(1968), particularly verse two (see Appendix III). 
adolescent attitudes. However, Beardslee and Mack 
(19831 claimed that it is.incorrect to conclude that 
youth are not worried or concerned about the nuclear 
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issue simply because it not spontaneously mentioned. 
In defence of such adolescent narrowmindedness, Bonieki 
(1980) concluded that most people's time and space 
horizons are limited to their irrLmediate vicinity. 
5.2.4 Political Knowledge and the Role of Education 
Self-centredness and narcissism may be on the 
increase, but Engestrom (1984) has offered a reason. 
He explained that the ignorance of most adolescents 
about international and defence issues is distinguishable 
by three important characteristics: compartmentalised 
thinking, fatalism, and ignorance. Compartmentalised 
thinking is exemplified by the frequent tendency for the 
same person to describe war in opposing ways, i.e. as 
glamorous and as disatrous. This appraisal might account 
for those subjects in this study who were both optimistic 
about their own personal futures, while at the same t.ime 
concerned about the threat of nuclear war. It might 
also serve to explain some of the inconsistencies \vhich 
McMurray and Prior (1985) found in their results. Where 
concepts of nuclear war include the view that is 
uncontrollable and/or inevitable, Engestrom argued that 
such fatalism is the result of ign.Qxance. Young people 
will not be able to think in realistic and constructive 
ways as long as they are ill-informed. 
The present data provided evidence that these 
ad6lescents were lacking knowledge; however, it was 
also the case that 75% wanted to know more about the 
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issues. Adolescents made C0ITU11ents like: 
INFORM US! WE NEED TO KNOW! 
How are we meant to know if we're not more informed 
about what's happening? We need more awareness 
programmes to make us think about it. 
How can we speak on the issues of today when we 
are not told about them? 
Why can't we study more about peace? 
Engestrom concluded that education about nuclear issues 
is an important way of helping youth to overcome feelings 
of fatalism or anxiety. 
5.3 IMPLICATIONS 
The implications of these research findings will 
be addressed relating to (I) clinical/mental health, 
(2) media effects, (3) political socialization and 
education. 
5.3.1 Clinical/Mental Health Considerations 
Rutter, Graham, Chadwick and Yule (1976) have 
suggested that young people's anxieties about nuclear 
war must be set within the context of their general high 
level of anxiety and depression. They concluded that 
"inner turmoil" as represented by feelings of misery, 
self-depreciation, fatalism and anxiety are quite common 
in 14 year olds. Some psychiatrists and psychologists 
generally suppose that adolescence is a period of great 
psychological upheaval and disturbance, suggesting maybe 
that the reactions of young people to the nuclear threat 
should be considered "normal ll • 
Lifton (1982b}, Lifton and Erikson (1982), and 
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Goldman and Greenberg (1982) believe that it is time for 
the mental health professional to treat the escalation 
of the nuclear arms race as society's most urgent mental 
health problem. They propose an examination of what 
forces produce II fla~l'led and dangerous II thinking, what 
forces allow such thinking to be accepted unchallenged 
by the public, and how professionals, as agents Of 
change, can treat these problems. 
Halasz (1984) believed that it is the mental 
he~lth professional's responsibility to evaluate whether 
such talk of personal or social conflicts is a reflection 
of normal development or il1.dica"tive of a troubled 
adolescent asking for and .in need of 6elp. Orbach and 
Glaubman (1979) . add a clinical dimension to the subject 
of fears about nuclear war. They proposed that 
adolescents ",rho talk of war and death may lect a more 
personal problem. Such talk may have a defensive 
function reflecting inner con£licts and struggles which 
are central issues of concern in adolescent development. 
5.3.2 Media Effects. and Considerations 
Most studies are in agreement as to the effect of 
the mass media, and particularly television on develop-
ment (Adler et al., 1980; Bronfenbrenner, 1975; 
Comstock et al., 1978; Greenberg, 1975~ Hinunelweit et 
al., 1977; Lalor, 1980). Discussing the impact of 
various socializing agents, Rosell (1968) stressed the 
influence of the mass media, which increases with age 
and mak.es a greater overall contribution to the develop-
ment of views on war and peace than the influence of 
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parents (stacey, 1978, p.62). New Zealand studies are 
in agreement thattel.evision ranks first as a source for 
information, with newspapers, magazines and radio rating 
much higher than teachers or parents. Hess and Torney 
(1967) have concluded that.the effectiveness of parents 
in transmitting attitudes.has been overestimated in 
previous research. Unlike the Canadian study, all other 
reviewed research suggests that Hess and Torney are 
correct. Beardslee and Mack (l983) confirmed that· most 
information about nuclear issues comes from sources other 
than parents. Mann and Digby (1984) reported that only 
about one-quarter of their sample cited personal sources 
(i.e. parents, teachers, peers) as compared with about 
three-quarters who indicated.mass media sources for their 
information. This presenJc study confirms these findings. 
The implication is, then, that media sources have a great 
responsibility in disseminating information which is 
accurate and creditable. One 14 year old female 
replied: III think a lot of television programmes are 
violent. On TV One I have seen people being shot, 
bashed up, stabbed, raped and blown up. I think it is 
a bad influence on children and adults. I would like , 
to see a lot of changes in television •.. programmes about 
people '\vho don't want to kill. each other .,'1 
5.3.3 Political Socialization and,~ducational 
Considerations 
Hess and Torney have proposed that the school 
deserves greater attention and more systematic evaluation 
of their methods, curriculum, and timing of political 
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secializa.tien. In the scheel curriculum, the tepics 
and cencepts that deal with civic educatien are usually 
taught unsystematically and ineffectively (1967, p.2l9). 
Censidering that ene~third of students in this present 
study claimed not to. have studied abeut war in scheel 
suggests that either their history ceurses have deleted 
majer events efthe past or 'the criticisms levied bear 
seme censideratien. Hess and Terney's appraisal also. 
advances warning.te these who. are planning to implement 
peace studies inte.the scheel curriculum, lest such 
studies meet \vith the same fate. Dierie (1985) believed 
that peace educatien is a paradexical issue and that 
II cenflict educatien" might be a more meaningful appreach. 
lie argued that if students are right that peace will no.t 
happen in their lifetime, then it is time to. go. abeut 
attaining realistic aims within cenflict. The scheel 
apparently plays the largest part in teaching attitudes, 
cenceptiens and beliefs abeut the epera.tien ef the 
pelitical system, and therefere its influence demands 
mere attentien. 
Rathenew and Smeker (19'84) have commented that 
the scheel, as an agency ef socializatien, has as ene ef 
its tasks the broadening ef understanding abeut 
They claimed there is a majerity suppert ,fer the idea ef 
peace studies in scheels. Markusen and Harris have 
argued that educatiensheuld play a crucial rele in 
reducing the threat ef nuclear war: \~ Unless the 
educatienal institutiens of demecratic society previde 
citizens with the eppertunities to. learn abeut the facts 
and issues ef nuclear war, the seciety will be severely 
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handicapped in its struggle for survival (1984, p. 301) • II 
Barnet (1982) claimed that the educational system 
has failed to prepare young people to live in Jche 
nuclear age. Lifton (1982) has observed that univer-
'sities have done virtually nothing to address the 
situation. In the 1980 l s, peace education needs to 
become the synonym for a movement to strengthen the 
awareness of young people as students about: 
the existence of conflict between people, and 
within and between nations. It investigates the 
causes.ofconflict and violence embedded within 
the perceptions, values and attitudes of 
individuals, as well as within .. the social, 
political and economic structures society, and 
encourages the search for alternati~ea, including 
non-violent solutions, and the development of 
skills necessary for their implementation.* 
Rathenow and Smoker (1984, p.l?l) 
Peace studi.es. have a considerable overlap with 
the aims of political education. According to Rathenow 
and Smoker, it should not only concentrate on specific 
subjects such as the analysis of modern technology, but 
should be considered as a dimension of the whole 
curriculum because the issues of peace and conflict are 
part of everyday life and the wide world. The Report (1982) 
to the Education committee of Working Party on the 
Development of a'Curriculum for'Peace Education has 
stated that education for peace should start from 
problems of everyday life in school and thus influence 
the climate of a school as well as 'the methods of 
teaching .. Some of the major curriculum aims of the 
* Stephanie Duczek has developed this widely accepted 
definition of peace education together with Colin Reid and 
Juergen Wehme'ier when being involved. in the two-year Peace. 
Studies project at the United World College of the Atlantic, 
South Glamorgan. ' 
Report are: 
To foster the ability to strive for peace in 
relationships between individuals, groups and 
nations, to establish a sense of responsibility 
for one's decision and actions ••• to understand 
the nature of resolving conflict •.• to develop 
an understanding of justice and welfare within 
and between individuals .and societies ••• and to 
encourage attitudes which will develop respect 
and a sense of personal responsibility for 
individual freedom and human rights l cultural 
diversity, the environment, and co-operation 
both within the classroom and outside. 
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Tizard (1986) suggested that well-defined courses 
on nuclear issues at school may help adolescents. 
providing constructive channels of communication would 
be a maj or beginning •. Knowing that their parents and 
teachers are concerne,d about these issues may change 
their perceptions adults as ineff~ctive and uncaring 
about the future, while greater intellectual understanding 
and more information may help to relieve their anxiety. 
Educating young people to the realities of the.nuclear 
arms race so that they can at least overcome the 
attitudes which stem from ignorance would be a major 
I 
step. The problem, then, is how to conduct such 
education. 
5.4 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study's survey was, inadvertently administered 
at a time when such films as "Threads" and "On the Eighth 
,,' 
Day" were being aired on television. These two films 
were dramatic documentaries about the effects of a 
nuclear exchange. It is likely that these films 
affected the attitudes of some of the subjects in the 
sample. Additionally, the recent sabotage bombing in 
Auckland harbour of an anti-nuclear protest flagship 
by French government-sponsored agents had the effect 
of heightening citizens to their vulnerability. 
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French nuclear testing in the Pacific has been a long-
standing controversy, but. never before has New Zealand 
been the victim of such b1at?int open. aggression. New 
Zealand has, in the past, been .immune from the intensity 
of widespread concern over nuclear proliferation which 
is more apparent in places like Greenham Common, U.K. 
and Hasselbach, West Germany. protesting of nuclear 
developments has been an on-going political activity in 
these countries. Fiske, Pratto and Pavelchak (1983) 
have suggested that the best predictors of anti~nuclear 
activity are the concreteness, .availability·and emotional 
concomitants of cognitive images. That is, people are 
more likely to act on their attitudes when the issue is 
salient to them. Zweigenhaft (1985) compared the 
effects of different stimulus materials on knowledge 
about the attitudes towards nuclear weapons. He founa 
that certain .stimuli enhance and affect attitudes about 
nuclear dangers. Consequently, it may have been the 
case that timely factors contributed to attitudes which 
were expressed in this study. 
This social survey faced the usual disadvantages 
of opinion research. Self~report limited the validity 
of the findings. Additionally, the self~administered 
questionnaire was dependent on literacy, educational 
level and acuity of the respondents. In other research 
(Chivian et al.I 1985; Cooper, 1965) the method of 
inquiry has been adjusted to suit the age level or 
nationality of their subjects. In this study, in an 
effort to acquire some systematic empirical data, no 
adjustments were made. wi th~ .. respect to age. However, 
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it may have been appropriate .. to have had a somewhat 
simplified format. for the youngest age group, if the 
sample is to incorporate such a wide age range. The 
use of a standardised questionnaire also limited the 
variety of. individual responses. However, open-ended 
interviews (as used. by Beardslee and Mack, 1982, 1983; 
Escalona, 1962, ·1963 and 1965; Schwebel, 1965) would 
have limited meaningful comparison. and increased the 
likelihood of subjectivity. There is some hesitance to 
suggest that the research findings were 'entirely object-
ively substantiated a projected aim of this study. 
If this research were to be repeated, some 
suggestions might be considered! 
(11 Identify (by open-ended response) each subject's 
three greatest concerns in rank order before the 
questionnaire is administered. 
(2) Replace Section I of the questionnaire with a 
Likert-type scale Cusing an agree/disagree 
format} and check for response-category bias in 
section III. According to Furnham (1985), half 
the items should ideally represent left and half 
right political views. In this study; the 
items were slightly skewed. towards right 
political views. 
(3) Include que~tions relating directly to PEACE, 
HOPES, MECHANISMS used by youth .to cope with 
their concerns. 
Martin (1982) impressed the need for more 
attention to what people can do to oppose 
nucle.ar war in their daily lives and less 
attention to the dangers of it. 
(4) As an investigator, this type of research 
should be pursued in association with others. 
Dealing in isolation wiJch these issues can be 
awesome. 
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In this study, it has been possible to consider only a 
fraction of the many aspects of the nuclear issue that 
deserve inquiry. There have been virtually no studies 
of the relation between the level of anxiety in young 
people about nuclear issues and their level of under-
standing of them. 
Another major area of interest is how the media 
(and significant others, like parents) transmit values 
on to young people. Additionally, it is not ~lear 
whether the nuclear threat has in any way directly 
resulted in an overall increase in their anxiety and 
unhappiness. It .has also not been conclusively 
established that the nuclear threat has affected 
personality development (Tizard, 1986). There is still 
a lack of understanding of the factors which influence 
adolescent attitudes, anxieties and knowledge nuclear 
war. These are research questions yet to be explored. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study has investigated the awareness of 570 
New Zealand adolescents and examined their cognitive, 
emotional and political reactions towards nuclear issues 
and towards New Zealand's nuclear prospects in world 
affairs. Most of these young people were found to have 
some degree of political awareness and ideas which were 
pessimistic about the future in the wider realm, but 
were more optimistic about their own personal future. 
The level of political understanding about nuclear 
is::;;ues and New Ze,aland' s political prospects in world 
affairs varied widely, between individuals, and by sex 
and age. In spite of the diversity of comments which 
arose from the qualitative analysis of comments through-
out the sample, a pattern emerged for the majority. 
Most of these youth were concerned and many expressed 
anger about the prospects of nuclear war, but they were 
not despondent. In line with some research from 
Canada, Finland, Sweden and the Soviet Union, these 
youth appeared to have been responding to the issues in 
a positive way. 
Anxiety associated with feelings of helplessness 
and hopelessness r as cited in much ,uf the research from 
the United States, remains less pronounced in the New 
Zealand studies which deal with nuclear issues. 
However, nearly half of the sample from this present 
study believed that there would be a nuclear war in the 
future and that New Zealand has enemies. Yet, there 
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was not a consensus over who was most likely to be. 
New Zealand's enemies. Volkan (1985) has described 
a developmenta~ phenomenon, the "need for enemies", as 
a manipulation with psychological roots which needs to 
be better understood. There was much evidence that 
young people were cynical, and cynicism appears to 
increase with age. However, a tendency for youth to 
. focus more.positively on personal concerns was also 
apparent. Narcissism, according to Engestrom (1984) 
is due to compartmentalised thinking, fatalism and 
ignorance. 
Most adolescents were aware o~ nuclear issues, 
but few had much advanced understanding or comprehensive 
knowledge. Thes.e same youth wanted to be more 
knowledgeable and desired more accurate information. 
Tizard (1984, 1986) sees a need for nuclear education, 
but highlights the problematic aspects of approaching 
the task. Any attempt to encourage informed thinking 
on nuclear issues nee'ds to take into account a wide 
range of intellectual context which includes the values, 
the beliefs and the attitudes of the young people 
concerned. School is an important ?gent for political 
socialization and to rely solely on the dispensing of 
information is not enough. There is a need for more 
systematic evaluation of the methods, curriculum and 
timing of political socialIzation. . A closer appraisal 
of these factors might provide a much better idea of 
the influences (media, parents, etc.) on adolescent 
atti tudes and the sJcrategies that are more likely to be 
successful in encouraging clear thinJdng about nuclear 
issues. These are matters for consideration with the 
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planned introduction of .peace studies in New Zealand 
schools in 1987. 
This investigation warrants further research 
which can accurately assess the impact of nuclear issues 
on adolescent beliefs, and can malce. progress towards 
explaining the discrepancies between research findings. 
It has not been satisfactorily substantiated that living 
in the nuclear age has affected personality development 
in ways which can be measured, although many psychi-
atrists and others believe this to be the case. It may 
be increasingly difficult to differentiate between those 
adolescent reactions which are normal and those which 
, 
are pathological, given the ever present threat of 
nuclear war. 
This study was clearly exploratory and it would 
not be advisable to draw causal inferences from the data. 
Nonetheless, the results strongly supported the viewpoint 
that an understanding of adolescent psychological 
interpretations of social issues can contribute to the 
understanding of subsequent social or political invo1ve-
ment. Attempts to encourage critical and informed 
thought regarding nuclear issues may be more difficult 
and, more of a political process than is often supposed. 
Exposure to nuclear issues should ideally leave 
adolescents with an increased awareness which allows 
them to confront the issues. rhe educational system 
and the mass media are two important avenues for provid-
ing this information. A deliberate focus on what 
nations have in common would help to counter the 
tendency to view what is different, perhaps antagonistic, 
in other nations. A greater understanding of the 
THE LlB:1ARY 
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development of political belief systems and how those 
beliefs are maintained is necessary to 'clarify these 
matters. 
research. 
Such considerations remain for future 
ADAMS, J.F. 
problems. 
397-400. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(1963) Adolescent opinion on nation~l 
Personnel Guidance Journal, 42 (4) 
101 
ADLER, R. (J980) The effects of television advertising 
on children: review and recommendations. 
Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 
ALLERHAND, M.E. (1963) Children in search of controls. 
Paper presented to the American Psychological 
Association, Philadelphia. 
ALLERHAND, M.E. (1965) Children's reactions to societal 
crises: cold war crises. American Journal of Ortho-
psychiatry, 35 (1) 124-130. 
RLVIK, T. (1968) The development of vievlS on conflict. 
war and peace among school children. Journal of 
Peace Research, ~. (2)~ 124-130. 
ANGELINO, H., DOLLINS, J., J!.1ECH, V. (1956) Trends in 
the fears~andworries of school children as related 
to socio-economic status and age. Journal of Genetic 
Psychology, ~ 263-276. 
ANGELINO, W., SHEDD, c. (1953) Shifts in content of 
fears and worries relative to chronological age. 
Proceedings of Oklahoma Academy of Science, l! 180-186. 
BACH.MAN, J. (1983) American high school seniors view of 
the military: 1976-1982. Armed Forces and Society, 
to (1) 86-94. 
BANDUPA, A. (1977) Social Learning Theory. Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
BARNET., R. (1982) Teaching Peace. Teachers Col 
Record, 84 (30). 
BARNET, R. (1982b) Fantasy, reality, and the arms race. 
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 52 (4) 582-589. 
BEARDSLEE, W., MACK, J. (1982) The impact on children 
and adolescents of'nuclear development. In Psycho-
social Aspects of Nuclear Developments, Task Force 
Report #20, American Psychiatric ""Association, 
Washington, D.C. 
BEARDSLEE., W., MACK, J. (J983) Adolescents and the 
threat of nuclear war. Yale Journal of Biology and 
Medicine, ~ 79-:9l. 
BECK, K., FRANKEL, A. (1981) A conceptualisation of 
threat cOIDI)1unicat.ions and protective health behaviour. 
Social psychology Quarterly, 44, 204-217. 
102 
BLACKWELL, P.L., GESSNER, J.D. (1983) Fear and 
trembling: an inquiry into adoleseent perceptions 
in a nuclear age. Youth and Society, 15 237-255. 
BLOS, P. (19621 On Adolescence: a psychoanalytic 
interpretation. New York: Free Press Glencoe. 
BMDP Statistical Software (1983) by W.J. Dixon (ed.). 
Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
BONIEKI, G. J . (J9 80) What are the limits of man's 
time and space perspectives? Technological Fore-
casting and Social Change, 17 161-175. 
BOULDING, ICE. (J984) Pathologies of defence. 
Journal of Peace Research, 21 (2) 101-108 .. 
BOYER, P. (1986} A historical view of scare tactics. 
Bulletin of the· At<::>mic: Scientists,· 42 (1) 17-19. 
BRONFENB RENNE R, U .(1961) The mirror image in Soviet-
American relations: a social psychologist's report. 
Journal of Social. Issues, 17 4 56 .. 
BRONFENB RENNER , U., MAHONEY, M.A. (eds) (1975) 
Influences on Human Development (2nd ed.) 
Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press. 
CALDICOTT, H. (1978) Nuclear Madness. New York: 
Bantam. 
CHIVIAN, E., rlJACK, J . E., WALETZKY, J. P ., LAZAROFF, C., 
DOCTOR, R., GOLDENRING, J .M. (1985) Soviet children 
and· the threat of nuclear war: a prelimina.ry study. 
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 55 (4) 484-502. 
CHIVIAN, E., SNOW, R. (1983) There's a nuclear war 
going on inside me. From International Physicians 
for the Prevention of Nuclear War Symposium. 
COLES, R. (1984) Thedoomsdayers: class politics and 
the nuclear freeze. Boston Observer, 3 (11) 1. 
COLE!l1.AN, J. (1961) The Adolescent Society~ 
Free Press of Glencoe. 
COLEMAN, J. (1980) The Nature of Adolescence. 
London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. 
New York: 
COMSTOCK, G. (1978) Television and Human Behavior. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
COOPER, P. 
war. 
t1965} The development of the concept of 
of Peace Research ~ (1) 1-17. 
CROAKE, J. W., KNOX,. F. H • 
of children '. s fears .. · 
91-105. 
(1973) 
Child 
The changing nature 
Journal, 3 (2) 
103 
DARR, J.W. C1963} The impact of the nuclear threat 
on children. American . Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 
33 C2} 203-2Q4. 
DIORIO, J .A. (1985} Conflict education: promoting 
peace without paradox. CUniversity of Otago), 
Paper presented to the joint conference of the 
Aus·tralian and. the New Zealand Psycho logical 
Societies, Christchtirch. 
EASTON, D., DENNIS, J. 
Political System. 
(1969 ) Chi Idren in the 
New York: McGraw~Hill. 
EKEHAMMAR, B., SIDANIUS, J. (1982) Sex differences in 
socio-political attitudes: a replication and' 
extension. British Journal of Social Psychology, 
21 249-259. 
ELDER, J. H. (1965) A summary of research on reactions 
of children to nuclear war. American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry, 35 (1) 120-
ENGESTROM, Y. (1984) Multiple levels .of nuclear reality 
in the cognition, fantasy and activity of school-aged 
children. Proceedings of the 4th Congress of the 
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear 
War. 
ERIKSON, E. (1968) Identity: Youth and Crisis. 
London: Faber & Faber. 
ERIKSON, E. (1985) Pseudospeciation. in the nuclear age. 
Political Psychology, ~ (2) 213-217. 
ESCALONA, S.K. (1962} Children and the threat of nuclear 
war. Child Study Association of America, Inc., 
New York. 
ESCALONA, S .K. (1963) Children and the threat of 
nuclear war. Paper presented to the AmericanOrtho-
psychiatric Association. 
ESCALONA, S.K. (1965) Children and thethreCl-t of 
nuclear war. In Behavioral Science and Human 
Survival by M. Schwebel (ed.). Palo .. Alto, California: 
Behavioral. Science Press, 208-209. 
ESCALONA, S.K. (1982) Growing up with the nuclear war. 
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 52 600-607. 
," 
EVANS, A. (1985) PsychologicaL aspects of nuclear 
confrontation. Paper presented to Nuclear Weapon 
Free Zone Committee Conference, Wellington. 
FISKE, S.T., PRATTO, F., PAVELCHAK, M.A. (1983) 
Citizens I. images of nuclear war: content and 
consequences. Journal of Social Is 39 (1) 
41.,..65. 
104 
FRANK, J.D. (1960) Emotional and motivational aspects 
of the disarmament prabl,em. paper presented to the 
American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C. 
FURNHAM, A., GUNTER, B.' (1983) 
and awareness in adolescents. 
Adolescence, 6,373-385. 
Political knowledge 
Journal of ' 
FURNHAM, A. (1985) Adolescents' socio-poli tical 
attitudes; a study of sex and national differences. 
Political Psychology, 6 (4) 621-636. 
GALTUNG, J. (1966) 
of disarmament: 
Proceedings from 
Assen. 
Attitudes towards dif forms 
a study of Norwegian public oplnlon. 
the IPRA Studies in Peace Research 
GALTUNG, J. (1969) Violence, peace and peace research. 
Journal of Peace Research, 6 (3) 167-192. 
GALTUNG, J. C1976}' Peace education. In Education for" 
Peace: reflections and action. Magnus Haavelsrud 
London: IPC Science and Technology Press. 
GALVIN, R. (1986) Considerable anti-nuclear energy. 
New Zealand Listener, 11 October, 55-55. 
GASTWIRTH, F., SILVERBLATT, J. (19 43) Reactions of 
j,uniorhigh children to the war.. High Points, 
25 56-63. 
GILLIES, P., ELWOOD, J.M., HAWTIN, P. (1985) Anxieties 
in adolescents about unemployment and war. 
B.ritish Medical Journal, 291 383-384. 
GILLIGAN, c. (1983) See,Goodman, Mack, Beardslee, Snow 
(1983) political ,Psychology, 4 (3) 507. 
GOLDBERG, S., La COMBE, S., LEVINSON, D., PARKER, K., 
ROSS, C., SOMMERS, F. (1985) Thinking about the 
threat of nuclear war. American Journal of Ortho-
psychiatry, 55 (4) 503-5 
GOLDENRING, J.M., DOCTOR, R.M. {1984} California 
adole~cents' concerns about the threat of nuclear war. 
Proceedings of the 4th Congress of the International 
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. 
GOLDENRING" J .M., DOCTOR, R.M. (1985) California 
adolescents' concerns about the threat of nuclear 
war. In Impact of the Threat of Nuclear War on 
Children ,and Adolescents by T. Solantaus et a1. (eds.). 
Internation Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear 
War. Helsinki. 
GOLDtoiAN, D.S., GREENBERG, W.M. (1982) Preparing for 
nuclear vlar: the psychological effects. American 
Journal of. Orthopsychiatry, 52 (4) 580-581. 
105 
GOODMAN, L.A., MACK, J.E., BEARDSLEE, W.R., SNOW, R.M. 
(1983) The threat of nuclear war and the arms race: 
adolescent experience and perception. Political 
Psychology, ! (3) 50l-53Q. 
GRAY, B., VALENTINE, J.J. 
knowledge and attitudes 
chlldren. New Zealand 
121-123. 
(l984) Nuclear war: the 
of New Zealand secondary 
Family Physician, 11 (3) 
GREENBERG, B.S. (1975) Television and role socialization: 
an overview.. In Television and Behavior by Pearl, 
Bouthilet, Lazar (eds). r 
GHEENSTEIN, F.I. (1965) Children and Politics 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
GHEENSTEIN, F. I. (1969) Children and Politics, 4th ed., 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
GREENSTEIN, F.I.(1968) Political socialization. 
In International_Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 
New York: McMillan. 551-555. 
HALASZ, G. (1984) Adolescent fears. of war. Lancet 
No. 8384, 1022-1023. 
HESS, R., TORNEY, J. (1967) The Development of Political 
Attitudes in Children. Chicago: Aldue. 
HIMMELWEIT, H.T., OPPENHEIM, A.N., VINCE, P. (1977) 
Youth, television and .experimentation. In Cultural 
Role of Broadcasting. Tokyo: HoSo~BuI'l;ka.Foundation. 
HOLMBORG, P .. E., BERGSTROM, A. (1984) How Swedish 
teenagers aged 13-15 think and feel concerning the 
nuclear threat. proceedings of the 4th Congress of 
International Physicians for the Prevention of 
Nuclear War. 
HYMAN., H. (1959) Political Socialization: a study 
the psychology of political behavior. New York: 
Free Press. 
JAMIESON, B.D. (1978) Scaling conservatism. New 
Zealand Psychologist, I (1) 1-7. 
in 
JENNINGS, M.K., -NIEMI, R.G. (1968) Patterns of Political 
Learning. Harvard Educational Heview, ~ (3) 443-467. 
JERSILD, A., GOLlvJAN, B., LOFTUS, J. (1941) A compara-
tive study of the worries of children in two school 
situations. Journal of Experimental Education, 
2., 323-326. 
KATZ, A.M. (l982) Life After Nuclear War. Cambridge: 
Ballinger Press. 
KENDALL, J. (1982). Opposition to nuclear education 
grows. The New York Times, 27 I-1ay. 
106 
KENNEDY, E.M., HATFIELD, M.O. 
Nuclear 
(1982) FREEZE! How You 
New York: Bantam. 
KRAMER, B.M., KALICK, S.M., MILBURN, M.A. (1983). 
Attitudes towards nuclear weapons and nuclear war: 
194 982. Journal of Social Issues, ~(l) 7-24. 
KRAUS, S., MEHLING, R., El~ASSAL, E. (1963) Mass 
media and the fallout controversy. Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 27 .191-·205. 
LALOR, M. (1980) The hidden curxiculum. In Television 
and the Family by R. Rogers Ced.). London: Univ. 
of London. 
LAPOUSE, R., MONK, M.A. (1953) Fears and worries in 
representative samples of children. American 
Journal of Orthopsychiatry, ~4 803-81 . 
LEVINE, S.V. (1981) The anxieties of adolescents. 
Journal of Adolescent Health Care, ~ 13 137. 
LIFTON, R.J. (1979) 'The Broken 
~~~~--~~~~~--
and the Continuity 
LIFTON, R. J . (1982) Beyond nuclear numbing. 
.College Record, ~ 15. 
Teachers 
LIFTON, R.J. (1982b) Beyond psychic nUmbing: a call to 
awareness. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 
52 (4} 619-629. 
LIFTON, R.J., ERIKSON, K. (1982) Nuclear war's affect 
on the mind. New York TIMES (Op-Ed column) March 15. 
LISTHAUG, o. (1986) War and defence attitudes: a 
look at survey data from 14 countries. Journal of 
Peace Research, 23 (1) 69-76. 
LOWTHER, M.P. (1973) The decline of public concern 
over the atomic bomb. Kansas Journal of Sociology, 
9 77-88. 
MACK, J. (lSl83) The psychological impact of the nuclear 
arms competibion on children and adolescents. 
Testimony to Select Committee on Children, youth and 
Families, U.S. 98th Congress, Washington D.C., 47-91. 
~1ANN, G., DIGBY, P. (1984) 
threat of nuclear war. 
of Health, Sydney. 
Australian children and the 
New South Wales Department 
MARKUSEN, E., HARRIS, J.B. (1984) The role of education 
in preventing nuclear war. Harvard Educational 
Review, 54 (3) 282-303. 
107 
MARTIN, B. (1982). Critique of nuclear extinction. 
Journal of Peace Research, 4 (19) 287--300. 
McMURRAY, N. ,PRIOR, M. (19851 Adolescents' cognitive 
appraisals, efficacy expectations and level of 
involvement in nuclear issues. Melbourne university, 
La Trobe University. 
MERELMAN, R.M. (19691 The development of political 
ideology: a framework. American Political 
Science Review LXII.750,....7 
MOLANDER, R. (1982) 
you? New York: 
Nuclear War: 
Pocket Books. 
what's in it for 
NEWCOMBE, M.D .. (1986) Nuclear attitudes and reactions: 
associations with depression, drug use and quality 
of Ii Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 50 (5) 906-920. 
ORBACH, 1. ,GLAUBMAN, H. (l979) The concept of death 
and suicidal.behaviour in young children: three case 
study. Journal of the. American Academy of Child 
Psychology, 18668-678. 
,,-
ORNAUER, H., WISBERG,'H., SICINSKY, A., GALTUNG, J. 
(1976) Images of the World in the Year 2000: a 
comparative ten 'nation study. Paris: Mouton. 
OSGOOD, C.E. (1962) An Alternative to War or Surrender. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press~ 
OSKAMP, s. (1977) Attitudes and Opinions. 
Englewood Cliffs, N. J .. : Prentice-Hall. 
PINTNER, R., LEVY, J. (1940) Worries of school children. 
Journal of Genetic psychology, 56 67-76. 
PLOUS, S., ZIMBARDO, G. (1984) The looking glass war. 
Psychology Today, 18 (11) 48-59. 
POOLE, M.E. (1983) Youth: Expectations and Transitions. 
l:1elbourne: Routledge. and Kegan Paul. 
PRATT, K.C. (1943) A study of the fears of rural 
children. Journal of Genetic Psychology, ~ 179-194. 
PRIOR, 1., PATTEN, D., MELLS.oP, TAYLOR, A.J. W. 
WagemaJcer (in press). Victoria University of 
Wellington, Wellington (private ,··circulation) . 
PRIOR, M. (1985) The nuclear threat: what do young 
people say? (La Trobe University). Paper presented 
to the joint conference of the Australian and the 
New Zealand Psychological Societies, Christchurch. 
RATHENOW, H-::F., SMOKER,. P. (1984) Peace education in 
Great Britafn: some results of a survey. 
Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 15 2 171-184. 
108 
READE.R I, S DIGEST (1947.) Mist of death over New York. 
Spring. 
REM1iJERS, H.H., et al. (1947) Youth looks at war and 
peace. Poll, #16. Purdue Opinion Poll for, Young 
People, Division of Educational Reference, Purdue 
University, Lafayette, Ind. 
REMMERS, H.H., BLUMENFELD, W.S., FRANKLIN, R.D. (1962) 
Youth attitudes toward civil defence, fallout shelters .. 
Purdue Opinion Panel Poll #65, Division of Educational 
Reference,Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind. 
ROSELL, L. (1968) Children's views of war 'and peace. 
Journal of PeaCe Research,.§. (3) 268-276. 
'RUTTER, M., GRAHAM,·P., CHADWICK, O.F.D., YULE, W. (1976) 
Adolescent turmoil; fact or fiction? Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry/ 17 (1) 35-56. 
SANDMAN, P.M .. , VALENTI, J .M.(1986) 'Scared stiff - or 
scared into action. Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 42 (1) 1 
SCHELL, J. (1982) The Fate of the Earth. Suffolk: 
The Chaucer Press. 
SCHELL/ J. (1984) The Abolition. London: Pan Books 
Ltd. 
SCHWEBEL,M. (1963) Studies of children's reaction to 
the atomic threat. American Journal of Orthopsychi-
atry, 33 (2) 202-203. 
SCHWEBEL/ M. (1965) Nuclear cold war: student opinion 
and professional responsibility. In Behavioral 
Science and Human Survival. Palo Alto/ Calif.: 
Behavioral Science Press. 
SCHWEBEL, M. (1982) Effects of the nuclear threa't on 
children.and teenagers. American Journal of 
Orthopsyghiatry, 52 608-6 
SCHWEBEL, M., SCHWEBEL/ B. (1984) 
to th~ threat of nuclear war. 
Orthopsychiatry, ~ 656-658. 
Children's reactions 
American Journal of 
SHALLCRASS/ J. t1968) Images of the year 2000. 
Victoria University of Wellington Education Department 
(private circulation). ~ 
SHALLCRASS, J., GAVRIEL, V. (1982) Images of the year 
2000. New Zealand Foundgtion for Peace Studies: 
Auckland. 
SIDANIUS, J. (1976') A Swedish scale of conservatism. 
Reports from the Department of Psychology, University 
of Stockholm, No.465 Ca), 467 (h). . 
SIDANIUS, J. (19851 Cognitive functioning and socio-
political ideology revisited. Political psychology, 
6 (4) 637 661. . 
SIDANIUS, J., EKEHAMMAR, B. (1980) Sex-related 
differences in socio-political ideology, 
Scandinavian Journal of psychology, 21 17-26. 
109 
SMITH, B. (19821 The threat of nuclear war: psycho-
logical impact.· Address. to the Physicians for 
Social Responsibility Symposium. Eugene, Oregon. 
SOLANTAUS, T. f RH1PELA, M., TAIPALE, V. (1984) 
The threat of war in the minds of 12-18 year olds 
in Finland. Lancet, ell No. 8380 784-785. 
SOLANTAUS, R., RIMPELA, M., RAHKONEN, o. (1985) 
Social epidemiology of the experience 'of threat of 
war among Finnish youth. Social. ience and 
Medicine, 21 (2) 145-151. 
'0 
SOLANTAUS, T., RIMPELA, M. (1986) Mental health and 
the threat of nuclear war: a suitable case for 
treatment? (private circulation). 
SPIELr.1ANN, M. (19.86) If peace comes ... futtlre 
expectations of Israeli children and youth. 
Journal of Peace Research, ~ (1) 51-67. 
STACEY, B.G. (1977a) The psychology of conservatism, 
Part I: ,the conceptual framework and theories of 
Eysenck and Ray. New Zealand psychologist, i 31-41. 
STACEY, B. G. (1977b) The psychology of conservatism, 
Part II: Wilson's theory and general trends in the 
study of conservatism. NewZealandPsychologistr 
6 109-123. 
STACEY, B.G. 
Society: 
Suffolk: 
(1978) Political.Socialization in Western 
an analysis from a life-span perspective. 
The Chaucer Press. 
STOLTE-HE I SKANEN , V. (1971) Sex roles i social class 
and political consciousness. Acta Sociologica, 
14 83...,94. 
STRADLING, R~ (1977) The Political Awareness of the 
School Leavers. London: Hansard Society. 
TAYLOR, A.J.W., PATTEN, D., CHUNG (in press) 
Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington 
(private circulation) . 
TAYLOR,A.J.W. (1986) psychologic~l aspects of 
potential nuclear disasters: weapons, winter, waste 
and wipe-out. Victoria University of Wellington, 
wellington (private circulation). 
The Report to the Education Commi.ttee of Working Party 
on the Development of a Curriculum for Peace 
Education. (1982), see Rathenow and Smoker (1984) 
Bulletin o£ Peace , 15 (2) 182. 
TIZARD, B. (1984) Problematic aspects of nuclear 
education. Harvard Educational Review, 54 (3) 
August. 
110 
TIZARD, B. (19861 The impact of the nuclear threat on 
children·s development.. In Children of Social 
Worlds; development in a social context by 
M. Richards, P. Light (eds)~ Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
TYLER, T.R., McGRAW, K.M. (1983) The threat of nuclear 
war: risk interpretation and behavioral resppnse. 
Journal of Social Issues, ~ .(1) 25-40. 
VOLKAN, V.D. (1985) The need to have enemies and 
allies: a developmental approach. Political 
Psychology, ~ (t) 219-247. 
WADE, I. (1962) Adolescent . reactions in the atomic age. 
Thesis: Washington state Uni versi ty • (r. 
WATSON, J.B. (1920) Conditioned emotional reactions. 
Journal Experimental psychology, 1. 1-14. 
WEINSTEIN, N.D. (1980) Unrealistic optimism about 
future 1 event.s~ Journal of Personali"ty and Social 
39 (5) 806-820. 
WILSON, G. (1973) The Psychology of Conservatism. 
London: Academic Press. 
WILSON, G.D., PATTERSON, J.R. (1968) A new measure of 
conservatism. British Journal of Social and Clinical 
7 2 
WRIGHTSMAN, .L.S. (1964) Parental attitudes and behaviors 
as determinants of children's responses to the threat 
of nuclear war. paper presented at American Psycho-
logical Association: Philadelphia. 
YANKELOVICH, D. (1982} Changing social values. 
Address to the Research Workshop in Preventative 
Aspects of Suicide and Affective Disorders Among 
Adolescents and Young Adults. Harvard Medical School, 
BostOh. 
YUDKIN, M. (1984) ~\fhen kids think the unthinkable. 
Psychology Today, April 18-25. 
ZUCKERMAN, S. (1982) Nuclear I 
London: Collins. ------------------------------
ZWEIGENHAFT, R.L. (1985} Providing information and 
shaping attitudes about nuclear dangers: implications 
for public education. Political 6 (3). 
111 
APPENDIX I 
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UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
HIGH SCHOOL SOCIAL SURVEY 
of 
NEW ZEALAND PROSPECTS & WORLD AFFAIRS 
This survey looks at various social issues relating to war and peace and 
how such issues affect New Zealand and the rest of the world. A study is 
being conducted by a postgraduate university researcher who is tnterested 
in how young people see these issues in 1985, how their notions may have 
developed and what their conceptions of the future may indicate. 
I tructions: 
The following statements in this secti~n mayor may not be important to you. 
This survey would like to know to what;extent you agree with each of the 
following statements. Please rate (on!the 7-point scale) the AMOUNT THAT 
YOU AGREE with each of the following statements. 
Here is an exarnple:- The past was DIFfERENT compared to 1985. 
, 
D 0 D I D D D D " 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
extreme moderate not-at-all 
amount of a~ount of 
'agreement aigreement 
I 
! 
"III means 
"2" means 
113" means 
"411 means 
"5 11 means 
116". means 
117" means 
that you agree with the s,tatement an extreme amount. 
that you agree wi th the sltatement very muc . 
that you agree with the sltatement a moderately more amount. 
that you agree wi th ihe sitatement a moderate amount. 
that you agree with the ~tatement a moderately less amount. 
that you agree with the statement not ch. 
that you agree wi th the s!tatement .:..:n:,::o-=t_-=...:...-=...:..:.. 
Please tick 
statement. 
( g) your personal answe,r in the appropri ate box for each 
Feel free to make additionia1 comments if you want to explain. 
SECTION I 
* 1. Year 2000 will be DIFFERENT, compared to 1985. 
0 D D D D D D 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
extreme moderate not-at-all 
amount of amount of 
agreement agreement 
113 
2 
2. MY LIFE will be better in 15 years. 
0 0 D 0 D 0 0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
extreme moderate not-at-a11 
amount of amount of 
agreement agreement 
3. MY LIFE will be better than MY PARENTS' LIFE has been. 
0 0 D 0 D 0 0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
extreme moderate not-at-a11 
4. Aggressive and violent behaviour are part of 'human nature' . 
0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
extreme moderate not-at-a 11 
c 
5. Human beings are capable of causing env i ronmen ta 1 damage to the earth 
which cannot be reversed. 
0 0 0 0 0 D D 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
extreme 'l1odera te not-at-a11 
, 
6. LIFE IN NEW ZEALAND will be better in 15 years. 
0 0 0 D 0 0 0 
1 2 3 I 4 5 6 7 
extreme moderate not-at-all 
7. LIFE-ON-EARTH will be better in 15 years. 
D 0 0 D 0 0 0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
extreme moderate not-at-all 
3 
8. Nuclear testing in the Pacific directly affects New Zealand. 
1 
extreme 
amount of 
agreement 
o 
2 
D 
3 
o 
4 
moderate 
amount of 
agreement 
o 
5 
9. There is UNLIKELY to be a nuclear war in the future. 
D 
1 
extreme 
o 
2 
D 
3 
o 
4 
moderate 
o 
5 
o 
6 
o 
6 
114 
o 
7 
not-at-a 11 
o 
7 
not-at-a 11 
10. If there were ever a World War III, it would certainly be a nuclear war. 
o 
1 
extreme 
o 
2 
o 
3 
D 
4 
moderate 
o D 
5 6 
o 
7 
not-at-all 
11. A nuclear war in the northern hemisphere would impact upon N.Z. 
o 
1 
extreme 
o 
2 
o 
3 
, IJ 
4 
moderate 
I 
i 
o D 
5 6 
D 
7 
not-at-all 
12. NZ's Civil Defence Organisation a~d NI's health services are prepared 
in event of a nuclear war in the northern hemisphere. 
o 
1 
extreme 
o 
2 
o 
3 
o 
4 
moderate 
D 
5 
IJ 
6 7 
not-at-a11 
13. NI's Civil Defence Organisation and NI's health services are prepared 
in event of a nuclear war reaching Australia and NZ. 
o 
1 
extreme 
D 
2 
o 
3 
o 
4 
moderate 
o o 
5 6 
D 
7 
not-at-all 
115 
4 
14. It would make a DIFFERENCE to me if I knew that there could actually 
NEVER be a nuclear war. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
D D D D 0 D D 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
extreme moderate not-at-all 
amount ·of amount of 
agreement agreement 
Smaller countries like NZ might help to prevent a nue1 ear war. 
D D D 0 D 0 D 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
extreme moderate not-at-all 
Interested and concerned GROUPS OF PEOPLE might help to prevent a 
nuclear war; for example, peace groups. 
0 0 0 D 0 D 0 
1 2 3 4 . 5 6 7 
extreme moderate not-at-all 
INDIVIDUAL PEOPLE might help to prevent a nuclear war. 
I 
D 
1 
extreme 
hope that MY 
D 
1 
extreme 
D 0 
2 3 
EXPECTATIONS 
o o 
2 3 
0 
4 
moderate 
about the future 
o 
4 
moderate 
0 
5 
are 
o 
5 
D 
6 
correct. 
o 
6 
D 
7 
not-at-al1 
D 
7 
not-at-a 11 
19. It is easy for me to ACCEPT my own expectations about the future. 
o 
1 
extreme 
D 
2 
o 
3 
o 
4 
moderate 
o D 
5 6 
o 
7 
not-at-all 
116 
5 
20. I am NOT OPTIMISTIC or HOPEFUL about the future for humanity. 
D D D 0 0 D D 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
extreme moderate not-at-all 
amount of amount of 
agreement agreement 
SECTION I I 
Pl ease ti ck ( 1.2]) your personal answer{ s) in the appropri ate box for each 
item. 
1 (a) Have you seen, heard or read anything about 
nuclear issues? 
YES 
o 
NO 
o 
If YES, then tick ( ~) the sources of your information: 
books tv parents 
magazines films relatives 
newspapers videos teachers 
radio friends other sources 
1 (b) Now go BACK to the list and @rclV those sources of information 
which were-most believable. 
*2. Do you think that some news should be censored? 
3. Has WAR been considered as an issue in any of your 
clasS-Subjects or coursework at school? 
4. Has PEACE been considered as an issue in any of your 
class subjects or coursework at school? 
5. Have NUCLEAR ISSUES been cqnsidered in any of your 
class subjects or coursework at school? 
6. Would you like to know MORE about nuclear issues? 
YES 
o 
YES 
o 
YES 
YES 
D 
YES 
o 
NO 
D 
NO 
D 
NO 
o 
NO 
NO 
D 
6 
7. 00 you think that NON-NUCLEAR or CONVENTIONAL 
warfare can ever be justified? 
8. 00 you think NUCLEAR warfare can ever be justified? 
9. 00 you think nuclear weapons are an EFFECTIVE 
DETERRENT to nuclear war? 
10. Would you let the prospects of a nuclear war 
affect your career plans? 
11. Would you let the prospects of a nuclear war affect 
your plans to ever have children? 
12. 00 you approve of NZ's ban on entry of 
NUCLEAR-POWERED vessels into NI's ports? 
13. 00 you approve of NI's ban on entry of 
NUCLEAR-ARMED vessels into NI's ports? 
14. 00 you feel MORE SECURE without nuclear-powered 
or nuclear-armed ships visiting NI ports? 
15. 00 you ever have dreams or nightmares involving 
nuclear warfare or nuclear weapons? 
16. Does the back cover of the local telephone book 
(concerning Civil Defence emergencies) tell you what 
to do in the event of nuclear fallout? 
17. Does NZ ITSELF have any foreign enemies? 
18. 00 ANY countries need nuclear weapons? 
19. Is it desirable to have small-scale nuclear weapons 
that a country can use on a LIMITED BASIS? 
YES 
D 
YES 
D 
YES 
D 
YES 
D 
YES 
D 
YES 
o 
YES 
D 
YES 
D 
YES 
D 
YES 
D 
YES 
D 
YES 
D 
YES 
D 
117 
NO 
CJ 
NO 
o 
NO 
D 
NO 
D 
NO 
o 
NO 
D 
NO 
D 
NO 
D 
NO 
D 
NO 
D 
NO 
D 
NO 
D 
NO 
I~I 
~ 
118 
7 
20 (a) Which countries have their OWN nuc]par weapons? 
o Austral i a D Great Brita in Pakistan 
o Canada D India c=J South Africa 
o China 
o France 
Is rae 1 
Japan 
D U.S.A. 
D U.S.S.R. 
20 (b) Now go BACK to the list and ~ any country which has dropped 
nuclear weapons on the populatlon of another country. 
21. Do you think that the U.S.A. ;s more likely to 
launch a nuclear 'first strike' than the U.S.S.R.? 
22. Do you think that a country other than the U.S.A. 
or the U.S.S.R. could start a nuclear war? 
23. Do you think that the U.S.S.R. could win a nuclear war? 
24. Do you think that the U.S.A. could win a nuclear war? 
25. Do you think that the U.S.A. ;s more determined than 
the U.S.S.R. to reduce the number of nuclear arms? 
26. Would you want to be a survivor of a nuclear war? 
27. Do you think that the U.S.S.R. is more determined than 
the U.S.A. to reduce the number of nuclear arms? 
28. In the future, do you think that there will be 
LESS conflict between COUNTRIES? 
29. Do you think that nuclear war is prophesised 
in the Bible? 
30. Do you think that peace and cooperation between 
all countries will happen in your lifetime? 
YES NO 
D C 
YES NO 
o D 
YES NO 
D D 
YES NO 
D 
YES NO 
o 
YES NO 
D D 
YES NO 
o 0 
YES NO 
D 
YES NO 
D 
YES NO 
D D 
119 
8 
SECTION I II 
Pl ease tick ( g) the fo 11 owi ng statements/words dependi ng on whether you 
have a reaction or feeling towards them. If you have a POSITIVE (+) reaction, 
tick "YES" and if you have a NEGATIVE (-) reaction, tick "NOli. If you are 
UNSURE or have NO OPINION, tick "?" 
YES ? 
* Aid to developing countries D D 
tJ 
D 
ANZUS (Australia/New Zealand/USA Treaty) 0 
Armageddon (final supreme conflict among nations) D 
Arms race (competition between countries for 
arms' superiority) 
Atheism (disbelief in God) 
* CER (closer economic relatiuns with Australi.a) 
CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) 
Comecon (East European Economic Community) 
Compulsory military training for young adults 
Decreasing military defence spending in NZ 
EEC (European Econom; c Commun ity) 
Fa i th in God 
HART (Halt All Racist Tours) 
* Love of country (national pride) . 
Materialism (acquiring money & possessions) 
Multinational interests· (big corporations' 
activities in many countries) 
D 0 
D 
D 0 
D D 
D D 
o C 
D D 
D D 
D D 
o 0 
D 
o o 
D o 
NO 
n 
~. ~. 
o 
o 
[J 
o 
o 
D 
o 
D 
D 
D 
o 
D 
o 
o 
9 
NACIA (Nelson Action Committee on International 
Affairs - Nelson's peace organization) 
* National independence (self-governing nationhood) 
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) 
Non-alignment in international affairs 
Nuclear deterrence 
Nuclear missiles 
Nuclear power stations 
Racial inequality 
Religion 
Royal ty 
SCEPTRE (a Nelson organization which supports 
existing Western alliances) 
Social welfare programmes 
Star Wars (United States' Strategic Defence 
Initiative in Space) 
Superpowers (extremely powerful nucl;ear nations) 
Trade Unions 
Unemployment 
Warning systems of nuclear missile attack 
Warsaw Pact (Eastern European Mutual Assistance. 
Treaty) 
YES ? 
D 0 
D D 
D D 
D D 
0' D 
o D 
o D 
o D 
DO 
D D 
o 0 
D 0 
o 
D 
o 
o 
o 
D 
D 
D 
o 
D 
o 
D 
120 
NO 
[J 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
o 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
o 
D 
121 
10 
SECTION IV 
14 15 16 17 18 
My age is o o o o o 
Male Female 
My sex is o o 
Please feel free to make additional comments if you want to explain any 
of your answers or make further comments about New Zealand's prospects and 
world affairs which reflect your own ideas. 
Thank you for your time and cooperation in completing this .survey. 
APPENDIX II 
FREQUENCY COUNT 
Total:i?ercentages of Occurrence for Variables 
obtained from the Social Survey Questionnaire 
(Total number (N) of subjects = 570) 
VARIABLE 
SECTION IV 
College: 
SSG (single sex girls') 
RUR (rural) 
SUB (suburban) 
SSB (single sex boys') 
Age: 
13-14 
15-16 
17-18 
Sex: 
mal~ 
female 
Com.ments: 
constructive (positive) 
destructive (negative) 
none 
SECTION I 
2000 A.D. will be different 
1-2 yes, very much 
3-4 
5-6 
7 no, not at all 
NUl'1BER 
OF 
. RESPONDENTS 
N 
136 
132 
163 
139 
150 
240 
180 
287 
283 
371 
10 
189 
294 
247 
25 
4 
122 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
TOTAL 
% 
24 
23 
29 
24 
26 
42 
32 
50 
50 
65 
2 
33 
52 
43 
4 
1 
123 
NUEI.lBER PERCENTAGE 
OF OF 
VARIABLE RESPONDENTS TOTAL 
N % 
My li (in 2000 AD) 
w.ill be better 
1-2 yes, very much 86 15 
3-4 259 45 
5-6 158 28 
7 no, not at all 67 12 
My life will be better 
compared with parents' life 
1-2 yes, very much 92 16 
3-4 219 . 38 
5-6 169 30 
7 no, not at all 90 16 
Life in New Zealand (in 2000 AD) 
will be better 
1-2 yes, very much 38 7 
3-4 217 38 
5-6 215 38 
7 no, not at all 100 18 
Life on Earth (in 2000 AD) 
will be better 
1-2 yes, very much 23 4 
3-4 154 27 
5-6 260 46 
7 no, not at all 133 23 
Aggression and violence 
are innate in humans 
1-2 yes, very much 145 25 
3-4 200 35 
5-6 179 31 
7 no, not at all 46 8 
VARIABLE 
Humans can cause irreversible 
environmental damage 
1-2 yes, very much 
3-4 
5-6 
7 no, not at all 
Pacific nuclear testing 
aff'ects N~w Zealand 
1-2 yes, very much 
3-4 
5-6 
7 no, not at all 
Unlikelihood of nuclear war 
1-2 agree very much 
3-4 
5-6 
7 disagree 
kelihood of nuclear war 
if World War III 
1-2 agree very much 
3-4 
6 
7 disagree 
Impact ofa northern hemisphere 
nuclear vlar on New Zealand 
1 .... 2 yes, very much 
4 
5-6 
7 no, not at all 
NUMBER 
OF I 
RESPONDENTS 
N 
466 
81 
16 
7 
273 
198 
80 
19 
35 
60 
205 
270 
409 
105 
46 
10 
390 
140 
33 
7 
124 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
TOTAL 
% 
82 
14 
3 
1 
48 
35 
14 
3 
6 
11 
36 
47 
72 
18 
8 
2 
68 
25 
6 
1 
VARIABLE 
Prep4redn~ss of New Zealand's 
civil defence (if nuclear war 
in northern hemisphere) 
1-2 yes, very much 
3-4 
5-6 
7 no, not at all 
Preparedness of New Zealand1s 
civil defence (if nuclear war 
in Australia/New Zealand) 
1-2 yes, very much 
3-4 
5-6 
7 no, not at all 
Knowing there I 11 be no nuclear 
war would make a difference 
1"':"2 yes, very much 
3-4 
5-6 
7 no; not at all 
Smaller countries (like New 
Zealand) might help prevent 
1-2 yes, very much 
3-4 
5-6 
7 no, not at all 
Groups of people might 
help prevent war 
1-2 yes, very much 
3-4 
5-6 
7 no, not at all 
war 
NUMBER 
OF 
RESPONDENTS 
N 
23 
124 
239 
184 
22 
104 
177 
353 
99 
58 
60 
191 
210 
115 
54 
177 
235 
112 
46 
125 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
TOTAL 
% 
4 
22 
42 
32 
4 
18 
31 
62 
17 
10 
11 
34 
37 
20 
10 
31 
41 
20 
8 
VARIABLE 
Individual people might 
help prevent war . 
1-2 yes, very much 
3-4 
5-6 
7 no, not at all 
Hopeful about own expectations 
1-2 
3-4 
5-6 
7 no, not at all 
Acceptance of own expectations 
1-2 yes, very much 
3-4 
5-6 
7 no, not at all 
Pessimism about the . future 
1-2 yes, very much 
3-4 
5-6 
7 no, not at all 
NUMBER 
OF 
RESPONDENTS 
N 
123 
179 
180 
88 
249 
177 
69 
75 
156 
260 
113 
41 
165 
213 
133 
59 
126 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
TOTAL 
% 
22 
31 
32 
15 
44 
31 
12 
13 
27 
46 
20 
7 
29 
37 
23 
10 
VARIABLE 
SECTION II 
AWareness of nuclear 
yes 
books 
magazines 
newspapers 
radio 
TV 
films 
video 
friends 
parents 
teachers 
relatives 
Belief in censorship 
yes 
War studied in school 
yes 
issues 
Peace studied in school 
yes 
NucZear issues studied 
in school 
yes 
Desire to know mqre 
about nuclear issues 
yes 
Justification for 
conventionaZ warfare 
yes 
NUMBER 
OF 
RESPONDENTS 
N 
565 
Sources 
N % 
345 61 
450 79 
464 81 
423 74 
530 93 
414 73 
233 41 
366 64 
339 60 
394 69 
157 28 
N 
95 
344 
226 
338 
426 
183 
127 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
TOTAL 
% 
99 
Most 
Believable 
N % 
-
165 29 
210 37 
239 42 
184 32 
375 66 
220 39 
119 21 
29 5 
96 17 
99 17 
17 3 
% 
17 
60 
40 
59 
75 
32 
VARIABLE 
Justification for nucZear 
warfare 
yes 
Nuclear weapons are effective 
deterrents 
yes 
Career pZans affected if 
prospects of nuclear war 
yes 
PZans for chiZdren affected 
if prospects .of nuclear war 
yes 
Approval. of ban on nucZear-
powered ships 
yes 
Approval of ban on nucZear-
armed ships 
yes 
Feel more secure without 
nuclear ship visits 
yes 
Occurren,ce of dreams or 
nightmares about nuclear w'ar 
yes 
Presence of civiZ defence 
emergency faZZout information 
(in tel~phone book) 
yes 
New Zealand has enemies 
yes 
NU]);1BER 
OF 
RESPONDENTS 
N 
68 
180 
99 
197 
378 
479 
314 
131 
22 
262 
128 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
TOTAL 
% 
12 
32 
17 
35 
66 
84 
55 
23 
4 
46 
VARIABLE 
Some countries need 
nuclear weapons 
yes 
Desirability of nuclear 
weapons on a limited basis 
yes 
Countries ''lith their own 
nuclear weapons 
yes, Australia 
Canada 
China 
France 
Great Britain 
India 
Israel 
Japan 
Pakistan 
South Africa 
U.S.A. 
U.S.S.R. 
Countries which have dropped 
nuclear weapons on the 
population of another country 
yes, Australia 
Canada 
China 
France 
Great Britain 
India 
Israel 
Japan 
Pakistan 
South Africa 
U.S.A. 
U.S.S.R~ 
NUl"ffiER 
OF 
RESPONDENTS 
N 
43 
52 
83 
146 
300 
524 
429 
170 
121 
173 
63 
112 
567 
567 
8 
3 
5 
25 
23 
1 
7 
9 
6 
2 
449 
23 
129 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
TOTAL 
% 
8 
9 
15 
26 
53 
92 
75 
30 
21 
30 
11 
20 
> 99 
> 99 
1 
<1 
1 
4 
4 
1 
2 
1 
79 
4 
VARIABLE 
Likelihood of U.S.A. launching 
a first-strike (rather than 
(U.S.S.R.) 
yes 
Likelihood of another country 
starting a nuclear wa~ 
yes 
NUMBER 
OF 
RESPONDENTS 
N 
221 
437 
U.S.S.R. could win a nuclear war 
yes 127 
U.S.A. could win a nuclear war 
yes 
U.S.A. more determined to arms 
reduction (than U.S.S.R.) 
yes 
U.S.S.R. more determined to 
arms reduc.tion (than U. S.A.) 
yes 
Desire to be a survivor of a 
nuclear war 
yes 
There will be less conflict 
between countries in future 
yes 
The Bible prediots nuclear war 
yes 
Peace and co-operation between 
countries wi11 happen in this 
lifetime 
yes 
108 
120 
153 
136 
113 
197 
88 
130 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
TOTAL 
% 
39 
77 
22 
19 
21 
26 
24 
20 
35 
15 
VARIABLE 
SECTION III 
Aid to developing countries 
yes 
ANZUS (Australia/N.Z./U.S.A. 
Treaty) 
yes 
Armegeddon (final supreme 
conflict among nations) 
yes 
Arms race 
yes 
Atheism (disbelief in God) 
yes 
C.E.R. (closer economic 
relations with Australia) 
yes 
C.N.D. (Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament) . 
yes 
Comecon (East European 
Economic Community) 
yes 
Compulsory military training 
for young adults 
yes 
Decreased military defence 
spending in New Zealand 
yes 
E.E.C. (European Economic 
Community) 
yes 
NUMBER 
OF 
RESPONDENTS 
N 
442 
262 
64 
62 
105 
405 
426 
109 
75 
197 
170 
131 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
TOTAL 
% 
% ilyes" of total 
yes/no responses 
93 
68 
20 
12 
29 
92 
90 
58 
16 
51 
60 
VARIABLE 
NUMBER 
OF 
RESPONDENTS 
Faith in God 
yes 
H.A.R.T. (Halt All Racist Tours) 
yes 
Love of country (natio-nal pride.) 
yes 
Materialism 
yes 
Multinational interests 
Yes 
N.A.C.I.A. (a peace organisation) 
yes 
National independence 
yes 
N.A.T.O. (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation) 
yes 
Non .... alignment in international 
affairs 
yes 
Nuclear deterrence 
yes 
Nuclear missiles 
yes 
Nuclear power stations 
yes 
Racial inequality 
yes 
N 
271 
232 
392 
131 
184 
307 
264 
229 
103 
265 
35 
129 
62 
132 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
TOTAL 
% 
% "yes" of total 
yes/no responses 
71 
53 
90 
42 
81 
88 
74 
76 
53 
62 
7 
28 
12 
Religion 
yes 
Royalty 
yes 
VARIABLE 
S.C.E.P.T.R.E. (an organisation 
supporting western alliances) 
yes 
Social welfare progranunes 
yes 
Star Wars (U.S. Strategic 
Defence Initiative in Space) 
YeS 
Superpowers 
yes 
Trade Unions 
yes 
Unemployment 
yes 
Warning systems of nuclear 
missile attack 
yes 
vvarsaw Pact (Eastern Eur0pean 
i:·1utual Assistance) 
yes 
NUl\ffiER 
OF 
RESPONDENTS 
N 
263 
208 
90 
436 
24 
36 
188 
54 
308 
157 
133 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
TOTAL 
% 
% "yes ll of total 
yes/no responses 
69 
57 
44 
94 
4 
7 
58 
11 
70 
62 
134 
APPENDIX III 
11 IMAGINE II 
by John Lennon 
Imagine there's no heaven 
it's easy if you try 
no hell below us 
above us only sky 
imagine all the people 
living for today ... 
Imagine there's no countries 
it isn't hard to do 
nothing to kill or die for 
and no religion too 
imagine all the people 
living life in peace •.• 
Imagine no possessions 
I wonder if you can 
no need for greed or hunger 
a brotherhood of man 
imagine all the people 
sharing all the world ... 
You may say I'm a dreamer 
but I'm not the only one 
I hope someday you'll join us 
and the world will be as one. 
(1968) 
